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GUNS AND DRUGS 
Benjamin Levin* 
 
This Article argues that the increasingly prevalent critiques of the War 
on Drugs apply to other areas of criminal law.  To highlight the broader 
relevance of these critiques, this Article uses as its test case the criminal 
regulation of gun possession.  This Article identifies and distills three lines 
of drug war criticism and argues that they apply to possessory gun crimes 
in much the same way that they apply to drug crimes.  Specifically, this 
Article focuses on:  (1) race- and class-based critiques; (2) concerns about 
police and prosecutorial power; and (3) worries about the social and 
economic costs of mass incarceration.  Scholars have identified structural 
flaws in policing, prosecuting, and sentencing in the drug context; in this 
Article, I highlight the ways that the same issues persist in an area—
possessory gun crime—that receives much less criticism.  Appreciating the 
broader applicability of the drug war’s critiques should lead to an 
examination of flaws in the criminal justice system that lessen its capacity 
for solving social problems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On August 12, 2013, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, Jr. made an 
unexpected announcement:  the Department of Justice would cease to 
pursue mandatory minimum sentences for certain low-level, nonviolent 
drug offenders.1  Speaking at the American Bar Association’s annual 
meeting, Holder delivered a stinging critique of the nation’s carceral 
policies resulting from the War on Drugs.2  All U.S. Attorneys would 
receive a policy memorandum setting forth a new, more lenient 
enforcement approach meant to remedy—or at least address—the fact that 
“too many Americans go to too many prisons for far too long and for no 
good law enforcement reason.”3 
The message was hardly novel—attorneys, activists, academics, and even 
judges had produced a litany of critiques of the War on Drugs and 
mandatory minimum sentencing regimes for decades.4  During Holder’s 
 
 1. See Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. Seeks to Curtail Stiff Drug Sentences, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/12/us/justice-dept-seeks-to-curtail-stiff-
drug-sentences.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/MYB7-XCKN]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. (quoting Eric Holder). 
 4. See, e.g., United States v. Phinazee, 515 F.3d 511, 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J., 
dissenting) (“This 25-year drug sentence is one more war-on-drugs case (among the 
thousands assigned to the federal courts each year by the Department of Justice) where a 
drug-addicted, young, black male goes to a federal prison for an unnecessary amount of 
time.”); United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 455 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he nation’s 
top law enforcement officer has said out loud what everyone has known for too long:  [t]he 
drug trafficking sentences that we’ve been dishing out regularly for more than 20 years are 
unjust, counterproductive, fiscally irresponsible and racially discriminatory.”). See generally 
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:  MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2010); JUDGE JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS FAILED AND WHAT 
WE CAN DO ABOUT IT:  A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS (2012); JONATHAN 
SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME:  HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE 
OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN 
AMERICA (2006); Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War:  Civil Liberties and the War 
on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389 (1993); Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the Carceral 
State:  The Future of Penal Policy Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1693 (2006); Juan R. Torruella, 
Déjà Vu:  A Federal Judge Revisits the War on Drugs, or Life in a Balloon, 20 B.U. PUB. 
INT’L L.J. 167, 188–90 (2011). 
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tenure in office, these criticisms came from a wide range of political and 
ideological sources and grew more insistent, driven by concerns about 
criminal law’s impact on the national debt and public polling suggesting 
greater tolerance for the use of drugs.5 
That the nation’s chief prosecutor would join this chorus was remarkable 
and signaled a potential watershed moment in U.S. drug policy and, perhaps 
more broadly, criminal justice policies.  Indeed, within a year of the speech, 
Colorado and Washington legalized recreational marijuana use,6 and the 
Department of Justice expressed at least a tentative openness to allowing 
states to experiment with drug policies.7  In short, while concerns about 
drug use, addiction, and trafficking remain widespread,8 Holder’s speech 
suggests an institutional willingness to reassess criminal law’s role as a 
solution to these problems. 
At the same time that politicians and legal scholars have begun to retreat 
from the criminal regulation of drugs, support for the criminal management 
of social problems has not necessarily dissipated, and the concerns 
articulated in the drug context have been identified sparingly in other 
corners of criminal law.  But why is that?  If we find compelling the 
critiques of criminal law as a blunt instrument for social change that has 
wrought undue collateral damage in the context of the War on Drugs, can 
we reconcile these concerns with a drive to criminalize other social 
problems?  If we are uncomfortable with the amount of power that 
mandatory minimum sentencing schemes have concentrated in the hands of 
prosecutors, and we are skeptical about the ways in which prosecutors have 
harnessed this power, then why should we be any more comfortable with 
mandatory minimum sentences in other contexts?  And, if widespread 
incarceration of particular demographic groups under criminal drug statutes 
 
 5. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Rand Paul:  Criminal Justice Hero, SLATE (June 23, 2014, 
6:38 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/06/rand_ 
paul_wants_to_give_ex_felons_the_vote_they_sure_won_t_vote_republican.html [https:// 
perma.cc/NSZ5-FSUJ]; Brian Bennett, U.S. Can’t Justify Drug War Spending, Report Says, 
L.A. TIMES (June 9, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/09/world/la-fg-narco-
contract-20110609 [https://perma.cc/JBN5-X9Z6]. 
 6. See Maria L. La Ganga, As Marijuana Attitudes Shift, This May Be a Year of 
Legalization, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/jan/19/nation/la-
na-marijuana-laws-20140120 [https://perma.cc/RLE2-QS3V]. 
 7. David Ingram, U.S. Allows States to Legalize Recreational Marijuana Within Limits, 
REUTERS (Aug. 29, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/29/us-usa-
crime-marijuana-idUSBRE97S0YW20130829 (quoting Ethan Nadelmann, executive 
director of the Drug Policy Alliance, as saying, “I was expecting a yellow light from the 
White House . . . [b]ut this light looks a lot more green-ish than I had hoped.  The White 
House is basically saying to Washington and Colorado:  Proceed with caution”) 
[https://perma.cc/8S9K-9MSD]. 
 8. See, e.g., Tony Dokoupil, Treatment or Jail:  Patrick Kennedy Wages Fierce Anti-
Pot Crusade, NBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2014, 1:48 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ 
legal-pot/treatment-or-jail-patrick-kennedy-wages-fierce-anti-pot-crusade-n22256 [https:// 
perma.cc/Y8PQ-F9HF]; Katharine Q. Seelye, Heroin in New England, More Abundant and 
Deadly, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/heroin-in-new-
england-more-abundant-and-deadly.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/ZX59-
9YPL]. 
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is a cause for public concern, why should widespread incarceration of the 
same groups under other criminal statutes be accepted without inquiry? 
In an effort to answer these questions, this Article considers whether the 
critiques of the War on Drugs apply to other debates about the structure of 
criminal law.  In light of the trenchant criticisms of the War on Drugs and 
their tentative acceptance by the legal and political mainstream, this Article 
asks how broadly these criticisms cut and how widely these lessons from 
the War on Drugs should be applied to pressing debates about the criminal 
justice system.  I argue that the problems with criminal regulation identified 
by drug war critics should serve as a taxonomy of collateral costs, a rubric 
against which to weigh the benefits of other criminal social reform projects.  
Put simply, the critiques of the War on Drugs are not—and should not be 
treated as—exceptional.  Rather, I argue that they stand as powerful 
critiques of governing via criminal law.9 
To this end, this Article distills the drug war criticisms into three general 
lines of attack:  (1) the disparate impact of criminalization and criminal 
enforcement on low-income communities of color; (2) the expansion in 
police powers and prosecutorial discretion that drug statutes and judicial 
opinions have facilitated; and (3) the social and economic costs that have 
resulted from the mass incarceration of drug offenders.  While certainly not 
exhaustive, this tripartite framing focuses the anti-drug war literature to 
help define three specific sets of costs that might be studied and weighed 
against the potential benefits of using criminal law to combat social 
problems. 
As a means of testing this rubric and of applying the lessons from the 
War on Drugs, this Article focuses on another area in which criminal law 
has become a regulatory paradigm of choice and in which many of the same 
pathologies appear:  gun possession.  Concurrent with the growing criticism 
of the drug war, gun possession has remained a target at the forefront of the 
push to criminalize dangerous markets and dangerous behavior.  My aim is 
not to suggest an apples-to-apples comparison between guns and drugs.  
Rather, it is to suggest that the legal treatment of gun possession is 
embedded in the same structure of criminal law and criminal law 
enforcement that has been critiqued in the drug context.  I argue, therefore, 
that applying the drug war’s critical rubric to gun possession highlights 
similar pathologies and speaks to broader flaws in the structure of the 
criminal justice system. 
At first blush, the legal treatment of, and political attitudes toward, gun 
possession and drugs may appear wholly distinct and unrelated.  However, 
this Article seeks to highlight the ways in which the criminal regulation of 
gun possession should be viewed in the context of the trenchant critiques 
leveled against the failed War on Drugs.10  Both criminalization projects 
 
 9. On “governing through crime,” see generally SIMON, supra note 4. 
 10. Here and throughout, I highlight that this Article is concerned with possessory gun 
offenses rather than crimes involving gun use.  That is, my focus is on nonviolent, possessory 
gun crimes where the law criminalizes possession of the hazardous item rather than the 
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have grown out of public concern about social scourges that have wreaked 
havoc in communities of color and lower-income urban communities, but 
both have also contributed to the mass incarceration of members of those 
same communities.11  Additionally, the two legal areas are deeply 
intertwined—drug convictions often serve as predicates for a range of 
felon-in-possession gun crimes, and policing of guns and drugs are often 
closely tied.  This Article therefore asks a question that is too often 
neglected both in the legal and political treatment of gun control:  If further 
regulation is indeed desirable, should such regulation come in the form of 
criminal sanctions for possession and, if so, why?12  Further, if criminal law 
is, or should be, the operative regulatory space through which to control 
gun possession, how might we avoid criminal statutes and enforcement 
mechanisms that mirror those deployed in the drug context? 
My goal is not to stake out new ground in the rich and varied literature on 
the normative desirability or the social costs of gun ownership.13  Indeed, 
the tragic costs of gun violence are what make gun possession such a hard 
case.  Nor does this Article seek to intrude on the fraught discourse 
surrounding the Second Amendment’s proper interpretation.  Rather, I hope 
to examine the social, economic, and political stakes of using criminal law 
as the regulatory paradigm through which to address public concerns about 
the ubiquity of guns and gun violence in U.S. society.  Much has been said 
and written about whether gun ownership should be regulated and, if so, 
how heavily it should be regulated.14  However, commentators and legal 
scholars have devoted surprisingly little attention to the criminal nature of 
gun regulation.15  For example, despite Holder’s public criticism of 
 
conduct involving the hazardous item.  While possession crimes as a specific type of offense 
have received sparse scholarly treatment, Markus Dubber has noted their role as a staple in 
contemporary U.S. policing and the troubling function they serve as a modern analog to 
vagrancy laws—vehicles to expand police power and to round up “undesirables.” Markus 
Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession:  The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 832 (2001). 
 11. See Anders Walker, The New Jim Crow?  Recovering the Progressive Origins of 
Mass Incarceration, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 845, 845 (2014); see also infra notes 121–40 
and accompanying text. 
 12. But cf. Jonathan Simon, Guns, Crime, and Governance, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 133, 145 
(2002) (“In place of a debate about gun control versus rights, I want to substitute a different 
kind of debate about the effects of governing American society through crime.”). 
 13. See generally GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (Bernard E. Harcourt ed., 
2003); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, LANGUAGE OF THE GUN:  YOUTH, CRIME, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
(2006); JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME:  UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN 
CONTROL LAWS (3d ed. 2010); MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE:  WHY THE CONSTITUTION 
CAN’T END THE BATTLE OVER GUNS (2007); ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT:  THE BATTLE OVER 
THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA (2011). 
 14. See generally supra note 13. See LOTT, supra note 13, at 10–11, 15–16, 37–100; 
TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 76–77, 85–95; WINKLER, supra note 13, at 9–10. 
 15. But cf. HARCOURT, supra note 13, at 233–35 (discussing the lack of a one-size-fits-
all policy solution to prevent juvenile gun offenses); Douglas A. Berman, Reorienting 
Progressive Perspectives for Twenty-First Century Punishment Realities, 3 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1, 17 (2008); Douglas N. Husak, Guns and Drugs:  Case Studies on the 
Principled Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 23 L. & PHIL. 437 (2004); Bryce Covert, Race, 
Gun Control and Unintended Consequences, NATION (Jan. 15, 2013, 2:33 PM), 
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mandatory minimum sentences in the drug context, little has been said 
about similar sentences for pure possessory offenses in the gun context.16 
This Article seeks to problematize the current and proposed criminal 
framework for managing gun possession.  By looking at the growing 
literature on the damage that the War on Drugs has wrought,17 I argue for a 
critical reexamination of the way in which criminal law is used to regulate 
firearm possession.  More broadly, by focusing on the “hard case” of gun 
possession, I argue that the costs that the drug war has revealed should be a 
central component of ongoing debates about the proper scope and structure 
of criminal law. 
To be clear, my claim is not that these critiques should operate as a test 
for when to criminalize and when to decriminalize.  That the critiques apply 
to gun possession (or, perhaps, to a much wider range of offenses) need not 
compel a decriminalization conclusion.18  Rather—as in the case of crack 
cocaine discussed in Part I.A—addressing these critiques may require a 
reshaping of both sentencing and enforcement regimes in order to confront 
and mitigate the distributional and collateral consequences of 
criminalization. 
In addressing the criminal treatment of gun possession through the lens 
of the War on Drugs, this Article proceeds in three parts.  The first part lays 
out three principal angles of criticism that have come to define the anti-drug 
war scholarship.  Specifically, this part articulates:  (1) race- and class-
based concerns about selective enforcement and disparate impact; (2) the 
consolidation and accumulation of power and discretion in the hands of law 
enforcement officers and prosecutors; and (3) humanitarian, democratic, 
and fiscal issues raised by mass incarceration. 
Next, the second part examines how the three critiques apply to the 
criminal regulation of gun possession.  This is a hard case—guns bear with 
them a set of deeply ingrained ideological priors and are inextricable from a 
highly fraught range of political debates.  Further, to some readers, gun 
possession may come too close to violent crime, such that any benefits of 
criminal regulation necessarily outweigh the high human costs.  
 
http://www.thenation.com/blog/172225/race-gun-control-and-unintended-consequences# 
[https://perma.cc/Z2PF-VBCA]. 
 16. But see Maya Schenwar, Opinion, Reduce Gun Penalties, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/15/opinion/reduce-gun-penalties.html (“Opposition 
to mandatory sentencing for drug-related offenses is steadily growing.  Now we must widen 
our criticism to encompass mandatory minimums for firearms.”) [https://perma.cc/ECM8-
WZ5X].  Douglas Berman’s work in this area has been a notable exception. See, e.g., Sixth 
Circuit Panel Finds Mandatory 15-Year Imprisonment Term Not Grossly Disproportionate 
for Possession of Shotgun Shells, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Sept. 11, 2014), http://sentencing. 
typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2014/09/sixth-circuit-panel-finds-mandatory-15-
year-imprisonment-term-not-grossly-disproportionate-for-posse.html [https://perma.cc/ 
DX3N-VWZ6]. 
 17. ALEXANDER, supra note 4; STUNTZ, supra note 4; Paul Butler, One Hundred Years 
of Race and Crime, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1043, 1047 (2010). 
 18. Indeed, while marijuana decriminalization has gained substantial support, scholars 
and politicians have not necessarily voiced support for decriminalizing a wide range of 
nonmarijuana offenses. 
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Nevertheless, this part argues that criminal treatment of gun possession 
bears some important similarities to controversial components of the War 
on Drugs.  Therefore, this part focuses on the ways that the three lines of 
the drug war critique apply to the criminal regulation of gun possession. 
Finally, the third part addresses the potential limitations of the critiques 
and also the problem of speaking monolithically of “guns” and “drugs” as 
generic categories, but concludes that criminal gun possession statutes 
exacerbate the pathologies identified in the context of the War on Drugs.  
This part, therefore, asks what such a conclusion might mean as a policy 
matter and how it might lead us to rethink the way that criminal law is used 
in this area.  By applying the lessons from the War on Drugs, we should 
think more carefully about the proper scope or function of using criminal 
law as the operative regulatory paradigm to address social problems.  If 
criminal statutes are the best (or the least worst) available means of 
regulating gun possession, we must address their structure, lest we repeat or 
redirect the negative collateral effects that have come to define the failed 
War on Drugs. 
I.  THE WAR ON DRUGS 
Many scholars have chronicled the War on Drugs and the searing imprint 
that it has left on the U.S. criminal justice system and on American 
society.19  Therefore, this part will not retread this well-worn ground to 
provide another overview of U.S. drug policy.  Instead, this part sets up the 
common critiques of the War on Drugs as a frame through which to assess 
the costs, benefits, and normative desirability of criminal paradigms for 
regulating social problems by outlining three general avenues of critique 
leveled at the War on Drugs:  the racial and socioeconomic discrimination, 
the metastasizing of police and prosecutorial power, and the cost (both in 
terms of human and economic capital) of mass incarceration. 
A.  Demographic Critiques 
Critics have attacked the War on Drugs from numerous angles, but 
perhaps no critique has captured the public imagination and has prompted 
as much damning scholarship as the disproportionate impact of criminal 
drug policies on low-income communities of color.  From articles,20 to 
 
 19. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 4; EVA BERTRAM ET AL., DRUG WAR POLITICS:  
THE PRICE OF DENIAL (1996); RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LEGALIZING MARIJUANA:  DRUG POLICY 
REFORM AND PROHIBITION POLITICS 20–60 (2004); DOUGLAS VALENTINE, THE STRENGTH OF 
THE WOLF:  THE SECRET HISTORY OF AMERICA’S WAR ON DRUGS (2004); Melody M. Heaps 
& Dr. James A. Schwartz, Toward a Rational Drug Policy:  Setting New Priorities, 1994 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 175, 179–91 (1994); Hon. Robert W. Sweet & Edward A. Harris, Just and 
Unjust Wars:  The War on the War on Drugs—Some Moral and Constitutional Dimensions 
of the War on Drugs, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1302 (1993) (reviewing THOMAS SZASZ, OUR RIGHT 
TO DRUGS:  THE CASE FOR A FREE MARKET (1992)). 
 20. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, In Search of Racial Justice:  The Role of the Prosecutor, 
16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 821, 830 (2013); Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law 
Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 257 (2009); John A. Powell & 
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books,21 to judicial opinions,22 the trope of the drug war as a racially 
disparate institution has become a staple of legal and social discourse.  To 
these critics, the War on Drugs stands as an enterprise that has further 
segregated U.S. society and created a demographically distinct criminal 
underclass.  Notably, the race-based critique of the War on Drugs has not 
been confined to academia or to the realm of progressive criminal law 
scholars.  Concern for racial equality under the (criminal) law explicitly 
animated Holder’s statements about the way that prosecutors were going 
about handling drug cases.23  That is, a belief that the War on Drugs falls 
afoul of racial equality principles is increasingly a mainstream view. 
Race-based criticisms have frequently focused on an area that provides 
an instructive frame to discuss gun criminalization’s costs:  the disparate 
enforcement of facially neutral drug laws against black defendants.  This 
disparate enforcement has led to higher arrests of black defendants than 
white defendants.24  Drug laws do not explicitly differentiate between 
defendants of different races or make any reference to race as a factor in 
culpability or sentencing.  Nevertheless, the enforcement of drug laws has 
helped shape a criminal justice system in which people of color are 
overrepresented both in arrest pools and prison populations.25 
The disparate impact of drug war policies on communities of color, 
coupled with a broader legal system hostile to convicted criminals (and 
even arrestees) has led Michelle Alexander and other scholars to categorize 
the War on Drugs as a “New Jim Crow.”26  As of 2000, “African 
 
Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War:  The National Purse, the Constitution and 
the Black Community, 24 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 557 (1991). 
 21. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 4; DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL UNDER LAW:  
RACE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS (2007). 
 22. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 98 (2007) (“[T]he Commission 
stated that the crack/powder sentencing differential ‘fosters disrespect for and lack of 
confidence in the criminal justice system’ because of a ‘widely-held perception’ that it 
‘promotes unwarranted disparity based on race.’  Approximately 85 percent of defendants 
convicted of crack offenses in federal court are black; thus the severe sentences required by 
the 100-to-1 ratio are imposed ‘primarily upon black offenders.’” (citations omitted)); United 
States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 912 n.14 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The disproportionate impact of 
the crack cocaine guidelines on minorities should concern every federal judge, and provide 
another reason why guideline sentences for crack cocaine offenders warrant special 
attention.”); United States v. Smith, 73 F.3d 1414, 1422 n.3 (6th Cir. 1996) (Jones, J., 
concurring) (likening the racial disparity of crack cocaine sentencing to the internment of 
Japanese Americans during World War II). 
 23. See Dan Merica & Evan Perez, Eric Holder Seeks to Cut Mandatory Minimum Drug 
Sentences, CNN (Aug. 12, 2013, 7:03 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/12/politics/holder-
mandatory-minimums/ (“Holder embraced steps to address ‘shameful’ racial disparities in 
sentencing . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/3JXK-H2U3]. 
 24. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES:  EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 60 (2014). 
 25. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 96–97; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra 
note 24, at 60; Butler, supra note 17, at 1048. 
 26. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 4; Ira Glasser, American Drug Laws:  The New 
Jim Crow, 63 ALB. L. REV. 703, 718 (2000); John Dewar Gleissner, How to Create 
American Manufacturing Jobs, 9 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 166, 193–96 (2013); Gerald P. López, 
How Mainstream Reformers Design Ambitious Reentry Programs Doomed to Fail and 
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Americans constituted 62.7% of all drug offenders admitted to state prison, 
which means that, relative to population, they were admitted at 13.4 times 
the rate of white Americans.”27  As of 2004, three quarters of those 
imprisoned for drug offenses were black or Latino.28  “In 2006, one in nine 
young black men was in prison, and black men were eight times more likely 
to be in jail or prison than white men.”29  Disturbingly, these disparities in 
enforcement are not necessarily reflective of similar disparities in rates of 
drug use or even drug dealing.30  Indeed, studies suggest that rates of drug 
use—particularly among school-age users—were substantially higher 
among whites than in black or Latino populations.31  That is, evidence 
suggests that illicit drug use or possession is not an epidemic confined to 
communities of color; rather, arrests for illicit drug use is an epidemic 
largely focused in communities of color.32 
Even if disparities in enforcement do not demonstrate racial animus, at 
least certain substantive components of the drug war’s legal architecture are 
based in racialized fears.33  Perhaps no component of the War on Drugs has 
served as a greater target for these race-based arguments than the longtime, 
statutory use of a 100:1 crack-to-powder cocaine sentencing scheme.34  
Passed in 1986, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act35 imposed mandatory minimum 
sentences based on calculations that equated one gram of crack cocaine 
 
Destined to Reinforce Targeted Mass Incarceration and Social Control, 11 HASTINGS RACE 
& POVERTY L.J. 1, 6 (2014). 
 27. Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 179 n.27 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 28. See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 96–97 (citing MARC MAUER AND RYAN S. KING, 
SCHOOLS AND PRISONS:  FIFTY YEARS AFTER BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 3 (2004)); see 
also Butler, supra note 17, at 1048. 
 29. Butler, supra note 17, at 1047 (footnotes omitted). 
 30. See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 96–97. 
 31. Id. at 97. 
 32. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 24, at 3; Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial 
Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land:  United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and 
Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 
1046 (2010) (“A critical fact often lost in the public debate over the propriety of the nation’s 
‘war on drugs’ is that the available statistical data suggests that Whites, Latina/os, Blacks, 
and Asian-Americans have roughly similar rates of illicit drug use.  Nonetheless, the ‘war on 
drugs’ as it has been enforced has had devastating impacts on minority communities across 
the United States.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 33. But cf. Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2344 (2012) (“Although many 
observers viewed the 100-to-1 crack-to-powder ratio under the prior law as having a racially 
disparate impact . . . only intentional discrimination may violate the equal protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” (citations omitted)).  See 
generally Christopher J. Tyson, At the Intersection of Race and History:  The Unique 
Relationship Between the Davis Intent Requirement and the Crack Laws, 50 HOW. L.J. 345, 
346 (2007). 
 34. See, e.g., John Conyers, Jr., The Incarceration Explosion, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
377, 381 (2013); Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code:  “De-Coding” Colorblind Slurs 
During the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611, 613 (2000); 
David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1283 
(1995); William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio:  Towards a Rational Cocaine 
Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1254–56 (1996); cf. William J. Stuntz, Race, 
Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1798 (1998) (arguing that the disparate 
treatment of crack and powder cocaine owes more to class bias than to racism). 
 35. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
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with one hundred grams of powder cocaine.36  The resultant sentencing 
scheme punished crack cocaine possession (a crime more often associated 
with lower-income black defendants) vastly more harshly than possession 
of its powder form (a crime less associated with low-income black 
defendants).37  Congress appeared to have distinguished between a “black 
crime” and a “white crime” and chosen to punish the former with much 
greater severity.  While still serving as a district court judge in the District 
of Columbia, Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer went so far as to describe “[t]he 
discrepancy in the treatment of those who traffic in crack cocaine versus 
powder cocaine traffickers [as] the most serious vice in the [Sentencing] 
Guidelines today.”38 
After decades of criticism, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 
201039 (FSA), which finally addressed the disparity.  In passing the FSA, 
Congress explicitly acted “to ‘restore fairness to Federal cocaine 
sentencing’ laws that had unfairly impacted blacks for almost 25 years.”40  
Subsequent judicial applications and interpretations of the FSA have 
highlighted this troubled racial history.41  For example, citing William 
Stuntz’s categorical critique of U.S. drug policy, a divided panel of the 
Sixth Circuit in United States v. Blewett42 went so far as to hold that “the 
 
 36. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii) (2012); id. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)–(iii).  See 
generally Conyers, Jr., supra note 34, at 381–82. 
 37. See Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer, Lecture, Mandatory Sentencing:  One Judge’s 
Perspective—2002, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 11, 16–17 (2003). 
 38. Id. at 16.  Introducing an analogy even more pointed than Alexander’s “The New 
Jim Crow,” Judge Oberdorfer begins his lecture on the flawed drug sentencing regime with a 
comparison to the Fugitive Slave Law. See Oberdorfer, supra note 37, at 12–13. 
 39. Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). 
 40. United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 484 (6th Cir. 2013), vacated, 746 F.3d 647 
(6th Cir. 2013). 
 41. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Black, 737 F.3d 280, 287–88 (4th Cir. 2013) (King, J., 
concurring) (“Prior to the FSA, Congress’s insistence on unduly harsh mandatory minimum 
sentences for nonviolent crack-cocaine offenders—even after such sentences were widely 
acknowledged to be racially discriminatory—was a grim misfire in the war on 
drugs. . . .  There is nothing fair about the ongoing plight of thousands of crack-cocaine 
offenders who yet languish in our prison system, serving sentences based largely on race-
based misperceptions, rather than on the gravity of their criminal conduct.”); United States v. 
Smith, 501 F. App’x 920, 923–24 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The FSA unambiguously reflects 
Congress’s judgment that the crack-to-powder ratios . . . continued to overstate the 
seriousness of crack cocaine offenses; continued to detract from the sentencing goal of 
punishing major drug traffickers more seriously than low-level dealers; and continued to 
undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system in light of racial disparities.”); 
United States v. Baptist, 646 F.3d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e believe that the result 
that we reach in this case—affirming a sentence of sixty months’ imprisonment for a minor 
drug offense under a law that Congress appears to have concluded was groundless and 
racially discriminatory—subverts justice and erodes the legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system. . . .  [T]he district judge understandably declared [that the result] made his ‘stomach 
hurt[ ]’ because it was ‘disproportionate [with respect to] African Americans’ and ‘wrong 
from a moral sense.’” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)). But see United States v. 
Rawlinson, 433 F. App’x 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[T]here is no evidence whatsoever that 
suggests that the distinction drawn between cocaine base and cocaine was motivated by any 
racial animus or discriminatory intent on the part of either Congress or the Sentencing 
Commission.” (quoting United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1992))). 
 42. 719 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2013). 
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federal judicial perpetuation of the racially discriminatory mandatory 
minimum crack sentences for those defendants sentenced under the old 
crack sentencing law . . . would violate the Equal Protection Clause.”43 
While I will focus more extensively on concerns about police tactics in 
the next section,44 it is also worth noting the significant role that racialized 
policing plays in this line of critique.  As in the context of the crack/powder 
sentencing disparity, allegations of racial profiling largely rest on the view 
that law enforcement has internalized racialized assumptions about minority 
criminality and then allowed these fears to guide policy and practice.45  
This criticism of racialized policing in the context of the War on Drugs has 
focused both on traffic stops (the phenomenon of stops for “driving while 
black”)46 and the street level practice of police “stops-and-frisks.”47  
Drawing from empirical studies, a range of scholars have highlighted the 
racially disparate impact of traffic stops and police interactions on nonwhite 
individuals.48 
Importantly, the critiques rooted in a theory of disparate impact generally 
do not rest on the innocence of the criminal defendants or arrestees.49  Men 
and women of color use drugs and take part in all aspects of the illegal drug 
trade.50  But so do white men and women.51  To proponents of race-based 
critiques, the enforcement mechanisms of the War on Drugs have grown 
dangerously preoccupied with the minority offenders.52  Instead of a system 
designed and implemented to control (or even eradicate) drugs and drug 
use, the criminal regulation of drugs targets one subset of potential 
 
 43. Id. at 484. 
 44. See infra Part I.B. 
 45. See, e.g., Glasser, supra note 26, at 712; Christopher Muller & Daniel Schrage, Mass 
Imprisonment and Trust in the Law, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 139, 154–55 
(2014); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity:  Racial 
Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 306–07 (2001). 
 46. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Gretna Police Dep’t, 175 F. Supp. 2d 870, 874 (E.D. La. 
2001) (“The Court finds it plausible that the reason why Defendant was actually pulled over 
was that he was a black man driving an expensive new car—the phenomenon known as 
‘driving while black.’”); Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 425, 431–32 (1997); David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic 
Offenses:  The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
544, 545, 558–59 (1997). 
 47. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Bailey, Watching Me:  The War on Crime, Privacy, and the 
State, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1539, 1557 (2014). 
 48. See, e.g., Glasser, supra note 26, at 711–12; Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. 
Barnes, Road Work:  Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 651, 660 (2002). 
 49. See R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling:  Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 571, 572 (2003) (“[P]olicy analyses should consider the race-related 
consequences of the drug war, without regard to whether officers engage in racial profiling.  
Given the high level of incarceration of disadvantaged racial minorities, those consequences 
would remain especially significant even if not one innocent person were investigated.”). 
 50. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 51. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 52. See generally Paul D. Butler, Race-Based Jury Nullification:  Case-in-Chief, 30 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 911, 914 (1997). 
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offenders.  The resultant legal regime has therefore become less a 
mechanism for social reform than a means of criminal social control.53 
B.  Civil Libertarian Concerns 
Police practices in the War on Drugs raise questions about the racial 
politics of criminal enforcement.  But they also have spawned a broader line 
of critique rooted in a set of concerns about an expansive police or 
prosecutorial apparatus.54  For want of a better way to categorize these 
criticisms, I term them “civil libertarian concerns.”  This set of critiques 
focuses on two interrelated elements of the criminal justice system as it has 
evolved over the course of the War on Drugs:  (1) the growth of power 
granted to law enforcement officers to combat the specter of a violent and 
omnipresent criminal drug underworld; and (2) the concentration of power 
and discretion in the hands of prosecutors via the rise of mandatory 
minimum prison sentencing schemes and plea bargaining. 
1.  Police Power 
First, scholars and commentators have identified the War on Drugs as a 
catalyst for the rapid expansion of police power over the last few decades.55  
Ultimately complemented by the strong statist policies of the War on 
Terror,56 the War on Drugs has cemented the public conception and legal 
status of a strong police force as an essential component of a functional 
modern state.57 
 
 53. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL:  CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER 
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 191–92 (2001); SIMON, supra note 4, at 6. 
 54. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 73–79 (describing police militarization and 
the rise of asset forfeiture); RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP:  THE 
MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES 242–308 (2013) (tying the rise in police 
militarization to the War on Drugs); David Boaz, A Drug-Free America—or a Free 
America?, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 617, 626 (1991) (emphasizing the “war” framing of U.S. 
drug policy); Peter J. Boettke et al., Keep Off the Grass:  The Economics of Prohibition and 
U.S. Drug Policy, 91 OR. L. REV. 1069, 1084–90 (2013) (describing the rise of police 
militarization within the context of the drug war); Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced 
Fourth Amendment:  A Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 
VILL. L. REV. 851, 893–94 (2002) (discussing police power as a component of the drug war); 
Finkelman, supra note 4, at 1390 (same); Powell & Hershenov, supra note 20, at 572–75; 
Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown:  The Emerging “Drug Exception” to the Bill of Rights, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 889, 890 (1987); Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex 
Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 473–75 (2010). 
 55. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 73–79; BALKO, supra note 54, at 243–48; 
Finkelman, supra note 4, at 1390. 
 56. See Aziz Z. Huq & Christopher Muller, The War on Crime As Precursor to the War 
on Terror, 36 INT’L J. L. CRIME & JUST. 215, 215–16 (2008); cf. Mary L. Dudziak, Law, 
War, and the History of Time, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1669, 1670–73 (2010) (describing the role 
of “wartime” as a concept in legal thought and lawmaking). 
 57. See James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness:  How the War on Crime Helped Make 
the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 374 (2009); cf. 
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS:  PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF 
NATURAL ORDER 40–44, 147–49 (2011) (arguing that “neoliberal penality”—an 
interdependence between laissez-faire economic policies and harsh punitive measures—has 
become a hallmark of post-industrial capitalist states). 
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Through a range of statutory mechanisms beginning in the 1980s, the 
federal government armed and militarized state law enforcement to fight 
drug use and distribution.58  The Military Cooperation with Civilian Law 
Enforcement Officials Act59 allowed the Department of Defense (DOD) to 
provide material support (both intelligence and equipment) to state antidrug 
initiatives.60  Similarly, in 1986, Congress revamped a federal aid program 
that provided large financial grants to state law enforcement agencies to aid 
in their antidrug efforts.61  The Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local 
Law Enforcement Assistance Program (or, commonly, “Byrne grants”) 
“encourage[d] multi-jurisdictional and multi-State efforts to support 
national drug control policies.”62  On top of these measures, in 1997, 
Congress enacted Program 1033, which authorized the DOD to transfer 
surplus military equipment to state and local law enforcement.63  As critics 
have noted, grants from the Department of Homeland Security have 
allowed local police officers to wage the War on Drugs with weapons 
purchased and manufactured for international combat and national 
defense.64  That is, the militarization of police during the War on Drugs has 
created a domestic space of conflict.  Viewed through this frame, some 
aspects of law enforcement look less like a preservation of public safety and 
more like an all-out battle between police and civilians. 
Not only have drug war critics focused on the empowerment of police via 
legislative and executive militarization, but they also have devoted a great 
deal of attention to the courts’ solicitude for police officers in their antidrug 
efforts, often at the expense of constitutional rights and individual 
liberties.65  As one set of critics puts it: 
Perhaps the judiciary’s single most destructive contribution to the drug 
war has been its creation of the “drug exception to the Constitution.”  In 
their eagerness to combat drugs, the courts have departed from 
longstanding fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendment protections.  As a 
result, they have upheld (1)  vague and over-inclusive search warrants; (2)  
searches conducted in the absence of warrants and without either probable 
cause or individualized suspicion; (3)  invasive hi-tech surveillance . . . ; 
and (4)  drug courier profiles, often including racial and ethnic 
 
 58. See Boettke et al., supra note 54, at 1086–87. 
 59. 10 U.S.C. §§ 371–382 (2012). 
 60. See id.; Boettke et al., supra note 54, at 1086–87. 
 61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3750–3755 (2012); see also Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing 
for Profit:  The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 42 (1998); 
Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 813 (2004). 
 62. TERENCE DUNWORTH, PETER HAYNES & AARON J. SAIGER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE BYRNE FORMULA GRANT PROGRAM 
(1997), http://abtassociates.com/reports/byrne-formula.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6XB-6GSE]. 
 63. See Boettke et al., supra note 54, at 1087. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See, e.g., Boaz, supra note 54, at 619; Finkelman, supra note 4, at 1390; Erik Luna, 
Commentary, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 757–68 (2002); David Rudovsky, 
The Impact of the War on Drugs on Procedural Fairness and Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 237, 240; Wisotsky, supra note 54, at 890. 
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characteristics, leading to departures from the requirements of 
individualized suspicion, to name but a few.66 
According to this view, not only have legislators and the executive armed 
police for a war against the citizenry, but the courts also have stripped 
civilians of many protections against police intrusions in the drug context. 
Although the Supreme Court has mostly allowed the expansion of police 
powers,67 individual justices and judges also have leveled critiques of drug 
jurisprudence from the bench.68  In his dissent in California v. Acevedo,69 
Justice Stevens expressed his displeasure with the Court’s complicity in 
overaggressive police enforcement of drug policies.70  Noting that “the flow 
of narcotics cases through the courts has steadily and dramatically 
increased,” Justice Stevens concluded that “[n]o impartial observer could 
criticize this Court for hindering the progress of the war on drugs.  On the 
contrary, decisions like the one the Court makes today will support the 
conclusion that this Court has become a loyal foot soldier in the Executive’s 
fight against crime.”71  Similarly, in dissenting from the majority’s narrow 
reading of the Fourth Amendment in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ 
Association,72 Justice Thurgood Marshall declared that “[t]here is no drug 
exception to the Constitution.”73 
Indeed, this sense that the policy concerns of the War on Drugs have 
trumped other sources of legal and constitutional authority has retained a 
degree of clout in certain Fourth Amendment contexts and has recurred in 
prodefendant rulings and dissents.  As the Sixth Circuit stated in United 
States v. Radka74: 
Presently, our nation is plagued with the destructive effects of the illegal 
importation and distribution of drugs.  At this critical time, our 
Constitution remains a lodestar for the protections that shall endure the 
most pernicious affronts to our society . . . .  The drug crisis does not 
license the aggrandizement of governmental power in lieu of civil 
liberties.  Despite the devastation wrought by drug trafficking in 
communities nationwide, we cannot suspend the precious rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution in an effort to fight the “War on Drugs.”75 
 
 66. Powell & Hershenov, supra note 20, at 578–79 (footnotes omitted). 
 67. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); Florida v. Bostick, 501 
U.S. 429, 439 (1991). 
 68. See, e.g., United States v. One Lot of U.S. Currency Totaling $14,665, 33 F. Supp. 
2d 47, 49 (D. Mass. 1998) (“Neither the courts nor Congress are empowered to suspend the 
Constitution so that the government may more effectively wage the war on drugs.”). 
 69. 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
 70. Id. at 601 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 71. Id. 
 72. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
 73. Id. at 641 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 74. 904 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 75. Id. at 361; see also United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 584 (6th Cir. 1992) (“We 
recognize that our government is in the midst of waging a ‘war on drugs.’  Yet, the valiant 
effort of our law enforcement officers to rid society of the drug scourge cannot be done in 
total disregard of an individual’s constitutional rights.”); United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 
1146, 1153 (6th Cir. 1991). 
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In short, much as commentators have focused on the deterioration of civil 
liberties in the context of the War on Terror, scholars and courts have 
identified the War on Drugs as a dangerous “state of exception” in which 
state authority and official force operate largely unchecked.76 
2.  Prosecutorial Discretion 
Moving beyond the massive increase in police power that has 
accompanied the War on Drugs, critics have also focused on the war’s role 
in expanding the discretion granted to prosecutors.77  Combined with the 
rise of mandatory minimum prison sentences, the proliferation of plea 
bargaining has helped shape a criminal justice system in which prosecutors 
are able to control case outcomes with limited judicial intervention.78 
Former federal prosecutors Robert Morvillo and Barry Bohrer claim that 
the rise of mandatory minimum sentences in the drug context has 
“change[d] . . . the balance of power between the prosecution and the 
defense” and “given prosecutors greater leverage to virtually compel plea 
bargaining, force cooperation, and in essence determine the length of 
sentences.”79  Similarly, federal defender turned law professor Ian 
Weinstein asserts that “the vast increase in prosecutorial power to control 
narcotics sentences is at the core of the problems with federal narcotics 
sentencing.”80  Notably, these critiques have gained steam among judges 
who have grown more active in criticizing the power of prosecutors and the 
role of mandatory minimum sentences and plea bargaining in the drug 
context.81  Judge Jed Rakoff, for example, has decried the use of mandatory 
minimum statutes passed during the War on Drugs as “weapons [used by 
prosecutors] to bludgeon defendants into effectively coerced plea 
 
 76. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent 
Emergency, 40 GA. L. REV. 699, 722 (2006). Cf. generally GEORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF 
EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., 2005) (describing the “state of exception” as an exception 
from restrictions on state violence or sovereignty justified by a state of crisis). 
 77. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 20, at 821 (“Disproportionate offending in certain 
categories of crimes . . ., racial profiling, the War on Drugs, and certain sentencing laws and 
policies all contribute to racial disparity in the criminal justice system.  The role that 
prosecutors play in the equation is unique because of their extraordinary power and 
discretion.  The impact of their discretion, power, and decision-making cannot be 
overstated.”); Dwight L. Greene, Abusive Prosecutors:  Gender, Race & Class Discretion 
and the Prosecution of Drug-Addicted Mothers, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 737, 745 (1991). 
 78. See, e.g., Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution:  
How Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87, 88 (2003). 
 79. Robert G. Morvillo & Barry A. Bohrer, Checking the Balance:  Prosecutorial Power 
in an Age of Expansive Legislation, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 137, 137–38 (1995). 
 80. Weinstein, supra note 78, at 88. 
 81. See, e.g., United States v. Phinazee, 515 F.3d 511, 527 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt J., 
dissenting); United States v. Spencer, 817 F. Supp. 176, 183 (D.D.C. 1993), aff’d and 
remanded, 25 F.3d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1994); State v. Rummer, 432 S.E.2d 39, 67 (W. Va. 
1993) (Neely, J., dissenting); Eli Saslow, Against His Better Judgment, WASH. POST (June 6, 
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/06/06/against-his-better-judgment/ 
(noting U.S. District Court Judge Mark Bennett’s lamentation of the mandatory minimum of 
ten years he was forced to hand down for a drug crime) [https://perma.cc/FW4W-M7UQ]. 
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bargains.”82  Put simply, those tasked with managing the daily functioning 
of criminal courts have come to recognize that the War on Drugs has helped 
cement prosecutors as the most powerful actors in the criminal justice 
system. 
C.  Opposition to Mass Incarceration 
The final critical intervention against the War on Drugs that I identify 
finds roots in a general hostility to U.S. carceral policy.  For those skeptical 
about the benefits of incarceration as a normatively desirable means of 
punishing offenders or who simply are concerned about the costs of 
incarceration, a criminal regulatory project predicated on wide-scale 
imprisonment cannot be appealing.  While some scholars have questioned 
the significance of drug criminalization to rising prison populations,83 
criminal law scholars and criminologists generally have drawn a strong link 
between the War on Drugs and mass incarceration.84  The 2014 National 
Academy of Sciences report on mass incarceration identified the War on 
Drugs as “an important contributor to higher U.S. rates of incarceration.”85  
As Stuntz puts it, while drugs were not the “primary cause” of ballooning 
incarceration rates, they were a “significant factor in exploding prison 
populations . . . .”86  Critiques of the War on Drugs, based on its role in 
creating our current system of mass incarceration, tend to sound in one of 
two registers:  (1) purely economic, focusing on the costs to taxpayers of 
maintaining such an expansive criminal justice system and such a massive 
prison system; and (2) social welfarist, focusing on the social harms faced 
by individuals and communities affected by the prison system. 
As to the purely economic perspective, critics have argued that the 
expansive carceral state simply is too expensive.87  In the wake of the 
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Michelle Alexander, Obama’s Drug War, NATION (Dec. 9, 2010), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/156997/obamas-drug-war# [https://perma.cc/6GNP-
LVLE]; Andrew Cohen, The Next Phase of the War on Drugs, BRENNAN CTR. (Aug. 14, 
2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/next-phase-war-drugs [https://perma.cc/E5M5 
-ACDF]. 
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global economic crisis that finds localities, states, and the federal 
government struggling financially, a focus on the enormous expense of 
maintaining prisons and prisoners has rallied a new group of critics of the 
carceral project from the right and energized more traditional critics from 
the left.88  The rhetoric of debt consciousness and a rising preference for 
austerity rather than broader social spending has begun to dull the appeal of 
punitive policies to many of their longtime supporters.89  While there may 
be great debate as to whether prisons work, as a matter of criminological 
theory or as a matter of public policy,90 there is no question that they are 
very expensive.91 
For fiscally conscious critics of the mass incarceration project, then, the 
War on Drugs is doubly problematic.  First, it has led to many new inmates, 
often serving multiple, lengthy sentences.92  Second, given the widespread 
questions about the war’s effectiveness as a means of controlling drug 
abuse or violence,93 the War on Drugs raises the specter of an incredibly 
expensive, failed government program, the sort of program that increasingly 
finds itself a target of cost-cutting budget proposals.94 
As to the social welfarist or humanitarian critiques of mass incarceration, 
concerns stem from both the quality of prison life itself and from the 
 
 88. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 87. 
 89. See, e.g., HADAR AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME:  RECESSION-ERA POLITICS AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT 78–79 (2015); Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing 
Mass Incarceration:  Lessons from the Deinstitutionalization of Mental Hospitals in the 
1960s, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 53, 78 (2011) (“The Great Recession of 2008 has certainly put 
severe pressure on the ‘prison bubble’ . . . as many states find themselves unable to service 
the debt associated with prison building or carry the expenses associated with massive prison 
populations.”); Vikrant P. Reddy & Marc A. Levin, Right on Crime:  A Return to First 
Principles for American Conservatives, 18 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 231, 244 (2014); Jonathan 
Simon, Law’s Violence, the Strong State, and the Crisis of Mass Imprisonment (for Stuart 
Hall), 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 649, 661 (2014). 
 90. See, e.g., MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS:  HOW TO HAVE LESS 
CRIME AND LESS PUNISHMENT 18–33 (2009); David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner’s Dilemma:  
A Cost-Benefit Approach to Incarceration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 905, 907 (2013); David S. 
Abrams, Estimating the Deterrent Effect of Incarceration Using Sentencing Enhancements, 4 
AM. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 32, 33 (2012); Rucker Johnson & Steven Raphael, How Much 
Crime Reduction Does the Marginal Prisoner Buy?, 55 J.L. & ECON. 275, 276 (2012). 
 91. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State, 16 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 259, 269 n.25 (2011) (collecting statistics); Katayoon Majd, Students 
of the Mass Incarceration Nation, 54 HOW. L.J. 343, 353 (2011) (“The mass incarceration 
that has resulted from these policies has been exorbitantly expensive; in 2008, for example, 
the costs of corrections in the country totaled an estimated $68 billion.”). 
 92. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:  
A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1330 n.72 (2005) (collecting sources); 
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American 
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1275 (2004).  This is not to mention many individuals 
in other aspects of the criminal justice system (e.g., those on probation, post-trial 
supervision, etc.) who similarly drive up the general operating costs for state, local, and 
federal law enforcement and corrections agencies. 
 93. See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 4; Juan R. Torruella, The “War on Drugs”:  One 
Judge’s Attempt at a Rational Discussion, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 235, 235–36 (1997); 
Comment, Changes in Prison and Crime Demographics, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1875, 1886 
(1998). 
 94. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 87. 
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problems associated with reentry into society.  In terms of conditions of 
confinement, U.S. prisons are generally considered to be less inmate 
friendly than many of their northern European counterparts;95 sexual abuse 
is common;96 and federal courts’ dockets are routinely crowded with claims 
about mistreatment at the hands of correctional officers.97  Put more 
bluntly, for many inmates, “[p]rison is hell.”98 
But perhaps even more important to this line of critiques is an emphasis 
on the collateral consequences of the criminal justice system.99  That is, 
difficulties for those who have been incarcerated do not necessarily end 
upon their release.100  Critics of mass incarceration have shown that 
formerly incarcerated individuals often struggle with the psychological 
aftereffects, such as posttraumatic stress disorder,101 and suffer from a 
range of social and economic consequences of their incarceration, such as a 
loss of voting rights, public welfare benefits, and employment 
opportunities.102  Additionally, these collateral consequences may affect not 
only criminal defendants but also their families and communities.103 
 
 95. See, e.g., Daniel J. Sharfstein, Human Rights Beyond the War on Terrorism:  
Extradition Defenses Based on Prison Conditions in the United States, 42 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 1137, 1142 (2002). 
 96. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, 48 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 11 (2011); Jeannie Suk, Redistributing Rape, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 
117–19 (2011). 
 97. See, e.g., Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) (requiring administrative 
exhaustion in suits brought by prisoners); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002) (discussing 
inmate complaint of prolonged and sustained pattern of harassment and intimidation at hands 
of officers). 
 98. Suk, supra note 96, at 111. 
 99. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death:  Rethinking Punishment in the Era 
of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1825–32 (2012); Michael Pinard, An 
Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry 
Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 686–90 (2006); 
Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions:  Confronting Issues of 
Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 459 (2010) [hereinafter Pinard, Collateral 
Consequences]. 
 100. See, e.g., JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD (2015) (cataloging the 
broader social effects of a criminal record); DEVAH PAGER, MARKED:  RACE, CRIME, AND 
FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION (2007) (describing the employment 
consequences for individuals with criminal records); JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME 
BACK:  FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY 151–85 (2005) (identifying a range 
of social, political, and economic obstacles faced by ex-offenders). 
 101. See, e.g., Craig Haney, Counting Casualties in the War on Prisoners, 43 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 87, 111–12 (2008); Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-
Offender Reentry, 45 B.C. L. REV. 255, 259 (2004). 
 102. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 24, at 233–80; MARIE GOTTSCHALK, 
CAUGHT:  THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 96 (2014); Pamela 
S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts:  Retribution, Representation, and the Debate Over Felon 
Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1147–48, 1164–69 (2004); Pinard, Collateral 
Consequences, supra note 99, at 467 (describing “several different types of collateral 
consequences, including not only felon disenfranchisement but also loss of eligibility for 
welfare benefits, public housing, and certain types of employment”). 
 103. See generally IMPRISONING AMERICA:  THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS 
INCARCERATION (Mary Pattillo et al. eds., 2004).  Indeed, it is this concern about the broader 
social impact of incarceration that drives much of the “New Jim Crow” analysis. See supra 
notes 26–32 and accompanying text. 
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As with the economic critique, therefore, the link between the War on 
Drugs and mass incarceration is damning.  If imprisonment produces such 
undesirable collateral consequences, and if the War on Drugs has led to 
greater imprisonment, then, syllogistically, the War on Drugs has produced 
many unwanted collateral consequences.  Accordingly, for critics of mass 
incarceration, the War on Drugs and the project of regulating drug use and 
drug markets criminally has wrought many ills and should be abolished.104 
Having established these three lines of criticism, the next part uses these 
critiques as a frame through which to focus on the criminal regulation of 
firearms. 
II.  GUN POSSESSION 
Despite longstanding public concern about gun violence, guns occupy a 
very different place in U.S. cultural, political, and legal discourse than 
drugs.  Unlike drug possession, gun possession remains deeply embedded 
in longstanding cultural narratives about American independence, personal 
autonomy, and national identity.105  With District of Columbia v. Heller106 
and McDonald v. City of Chicago,107 the Supreme Court went so far as to 
conclude that individual gun ownership was not only an important 
component of the nation’s history, but also a constitutional right guaranteed 
by the Second Amendment.108  Put simply, then, gun ownership is 
frequently not only lawful, it is also constitutionally protected.  By contrast, 
whatever consensus in favor of decriminalizing marijuana may be 
emerging, there certainly is no right to possess marijuana (or any other 
drug) enshrined in the Constitution. 
If the last decade has seen the Supreme Court take unprecedented steps to 
protect the rights of gun owners, how can I suggest that the legal treatment 
of gun possession resembles the criminal architecture of the drug war?  If 
the Republican Party lists gun rights as one of its key platform plans and the 
National Rifle Association (NRA) continues to exercise tremendous 
 
 104. See, e.g., Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose:  Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 
YALE L.J. 2176, 2203 (2013). 
 105. See, e.g., RICHARD SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION:  THE MYTH OF THE FRONTIER IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1992) (chronicling the importance of the rugged, 
individualist cowboy in U.S. mass culture); JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW:  HOW THE 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 82–86 (2009) (discussing the 
trope of gun ownership as essential to protection of the home); TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 
75 (arguing that attitudes about gun control and the Second Amendment are inextricably tied 
to views about U.S. society); see also CHARLES E. COBB, JR., THIS NONVIOLENT STUFF’LL 
GET YOU KILLED:  HOW GUNS MADE THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT POSSIBLE (2014) (arguing 
that gun ownership and armed self-defense were essential to the success of the civil rights 
movement); NICHOLAS JOHNSON, NEGROES AND THE GUN:  THE BLACK TRADITION OF ARMS 
(2014) (chronicling the social function of gun ownership in black communities combating 
racial oppression). 
 106. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 107. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 108. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750. 
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political clout,109 how can gun owners be characterized as a beleaguered 
population? 
These critiques miss the ways in which the political valence of the gun 
debate has contributed to an overreliance on criminal law to regulate gun 
possession.  Gun control proponents have long sought to advance legal 
measures that make it harder for individuals to own guns; gun rights 
advocates have strongly opposed these measures.110  But this easy story 
misses a crucial point of consensus.  Both sides of the gun control debate 
have occasionally compromised, and these compromises have generally 
yielded criminal statutes designed to impose harsh punishments on unlawful 
gun owners.111  That is, in a polarized political climate, there is 
occasionally a space for consensus gun control—criminal law.112 
In the drug context, there may have been (and may still be) noncriminal 
alternatives to the criminal model (e.g., education, medical treatment for 
addicts, and other social and economic policies to address root causes of 
drug use),113 but political actors coalesced around a model of 
criminalization and incarceration.  Similarly, in the gun possession context, 
the realpolitik compromise has yielded regulation, but regulation in the 
form of criminal statutes.114 
 
 109. See, e.g., Joan Burbick, Cultural Anatomy of a Gun Show, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
657, 665 (2006); Michael J. Zimmer, Inequality, Individualized Risk, and Insecurity, 2013 
WIS. L. REV. 1, 60 n.319; GOP Adopts Strongly Pro-Gun Platform, NRA (Aug. 31, 2012), 
http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/articles/2012/gop-adopts-strongly-pro-gun-platform.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/2XRG-9WUR]. 
 110. See generally Franklin E. Zimring, Continuity and Change in the American Gun 
Debate, in GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, supra note 13, at 29–43. 
 111. See infra Part III.B. 
 112. See James B. Jacobs & David Kairys, Can Handguns Be Effectively Regulated?, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 188, 190 (2007) (“There are many types of gun control that 
range from imprisoning armed felons to imposing tort liability on manufacturers.  The most 
politically popular type of gun control in the U.S. is the severe punishment of crimes 
committed with firearms.  All Americans support severe sentences for firearms offenders, 
except for those who advocate reduced punishment and imprisonment across the board.”); 
see also Jonathan Simon, Gun Rights and the Constitutional Significance of Violent Crime, 
12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 335, 355–56 (2004) (arguing that gun control and gun rights 
activists have both come to frame their positions in terms of violent crime). 
 113. See, e.g., Melissa T. Aoyagi, Beyond Punitive Prohibition:  Liberalizing the 
Dialogue on International Drug Policy, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 555, 570–77 (2005); 
Stephen Hunter et al., New Jersey’s Drug Courts:  A Fundamental Shift from the War on 
Drugs to a Public Health Approach for Drug Addiction and Drug-Related Crime, 64 
RUTGERS L. REV. 795, 818–20 (2012). 
 114. For examples of such criminal possession statutes, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 
(2012) (outlawing gun possession by individuals with felony convictions); id. § 924(c) 
(imposing mandatory-minimum prison term for possessing a gun during commission of a 
drug offense or a “crime of violence”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-102 (West 2013) 
(outlawing possession of “firearm silencer[s], machine gun[s], short shotgun[s], [and] short 
rifle[s]”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-123 (2011) (imposing a five-year penalty for possessing 
certain types of firearms); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-1-7 (LexisNexis 2009) (cataloging 
classes of individuals who may possess firearms; these classes exclude individuals who:  
“have a conviction for a crime for which the person could have been sentenced for more than 
one (1) year,” “have a record of being an alcohol or drug abuser,” “have a conviction for 
resisting law enforcement . . . within five (5) years before the person applies for a license or 
permit under this chapter”); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10 (LexisNexis 2015) (imposing 
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In an effort to explore the potential costs of this compromise, this part 
addresses the criminal treatment of gun possession through the three critical 
lenses introduced in Part I.  First, it examines how demographic and race-
based critiques apply to the enforcement of criminal gun statutes.  Next, it 
shifts focus to the civil libertarian critiques introduced above, namely the 
increasing power consolidated in the hands of police and prosecutors in the 
enforcement of criminal gun statutes.  Finally, this part addresses the role of 
weapons charges as a driver of mass incarceration and as implicating 
concerns about collateral consequences. 
A.  Demographics:  Different Crimes, Same Defendants 
Initially, what makes the racial politics of criminalizing gun possession 
so fascinating is the way in which it complicates and subverts the familiar 
cultural narrative of gun debates and scholarship.  One consequence of the 
political Right’s support for gun rights is the popularization of the image of 
the gun owner as rural white male.  This idealized gun owner has become a 
symbol of sorts in a wide variety of political debates and, indeed, in a range 
of scholarly debates regarding the legal treatment of firearms and self-
defense.115 
If we are concerned about the effects of criminal regulation, however, 
this framing may be inaccurate and terribly deceptive.  Even if the 
stereotypical white male NRA member were the prototypical gun owner,116 
this does not mean that he would be the prototypical defendant in a criminal 
weapons case.117  Further, this cultural narrative downplays the significant 
role that racially inflected politics historically have played in gun control 
 
penalties for the possession of sawed-off shotguns); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1 (2013) 
(outlawing possession of firearms by all convicted felons); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6105 
(West 2016) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-30 (2011) (same). 
 115. See generally Richard Slotkin, The Cult of the Colt in American Culture, in GUNS, 
CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, supra note 13, at 54–67. 
 116. Recent scholarly interventions in the legal literature on gun regulation have sought to 
undermine the image of gun ownership as a tool of white supremacy or as the exclusive 
province of white Americans. See, e.g., COBB, supra note 105, at 114–48; JOHNSON, supra 
note 105, at 13–15; cf. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, NEGROES WITH GUNS (Marc Schleifer ed., 
1962) (describing proponents of armed resistance within the Civil Rights movement).  These 
accounts treat guns as a social and political equalizer, a means of empowering an otherwise 
disenfranchised or repressed minority. See, e.g., COBB, supra note 105; JOHNSON, supra note 
105, at 187–226; see also John Salter & Don B. Kates, Jr., The Necessity of Access to 
Firearms by Dissenters and Minorities Whom Government Is Unwilling or Unable to 
Protect, in RESTRICTING HANDGUNS:  THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT 185, 185–93 (Don 
B. Kates, Jr. ed., 1979) [hereinafter RESTRICTING HANDGUNS]; cf. Carol Ruth Silver & Don 
B. Kates, Jr., Self-Defense, Handgun Ownership, and the Independence of Women in a 
Violent Sexist Society, in RESTRICTING HANDGUNS, supra, at 139, 148–50 (arguing that gun 
ownership is important to women as a means of counteracting male violence).  While these 
revisionist histories certainly provide support to my broader claim that we should be careful 
about making policy decisions based on an imagined white male gun owner, this Article 
does not purport to make any claims about the relative importance of guns or gun ownership 
in black and white communities. 
 117. Cf. Benjamin Levin, Note, A Defensible Defense?:  Reexamining Castle Doctrine 
Statutes, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 523, 545–52 (2010) (raising a similar argument in the 
context of “castle doctrine” self-defense statutes). 
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efforts.118  While critics of the War on Drugs’ disparate racial impact have 
offered up powerful statistical evidence of the racial breakdown of drug 
arrests and charges, scholars generally have not focused on the racial 
breakdown of weapons arrests and charges.  Indeed, in his critical review of 
Alexander’s account, legal historian Anders Walker contends that the 
existing “New Jim Crow” narrative downplays the role of gun possession 
crimes as drivers of racially disparate incarceration rates.119 
While Walker does not offer the sorts of compelling data that help 
support Alexander’s claims about the War on Drugs,120 and while fewer 
published studies focus on the racial dynamics of criminal gun law, the 
evidence that we do have suggests that people of color bear the brunt of 
enforcement.  As of 1995, nationwide FBI crime reports showed that 
weapons arrest rates were five times greater for blacks than white.121  In 
2000, 54 percent of the state court defendants convicted for weapons crimes 
were black, as compared to 44 percent white.122  This is a higher percentage 
than in all but three of the eighteen other categories of crimes tracked by the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and a higher percentage than the total for 
all offenses (54 percent white; 44 percent black; and 2 percent “other”).123  
In 2004, these statistics for state courts were nearly identical—55 percent of 
defendants convicted of weapons offenses were black, a higher percentage 
than for drug offenses (46 percent) and all offenses (38 percent).124  
Further, as of December 31, 2013, BJS estimated that 24,400 black inmates 
 
 118. See, e.g., T. Markus Funk, Gun Control in America:  A History of Discrimination 
Against the Poor and Minorities, in GUNS IN AMERICA:  A READER 390, 390 (Jan E. Dizard et 
al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter GUNS IN AMERICA] (“One undeniable aspect of the history of gun 
control in the United States has been the conception that the poor, especially the non-white 
poor, cannot be trusted with firearms.”); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The 
Second Amendment:  Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 
(1991); Angela R. Riley, Indians and Guns, 100 GEO. L.J. 1675, 1712 (2012); Reva B. 
Siegel, Dead or Alive:  Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 191, 245 (2008). 
 119. See Walker, supra note 11, at 868–72. 
 120. See id.  Walker’s discussion of “the liberal war on guns” focuses exclusively on a 
single sting operation conducted in St. Louis by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms. See id.  For a description of the sting operation, see generally Robert Patrick, 
Four-Month ATF Operation in St. Louis Yields Arrests, Seizures of Guns and Drugs, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (July 11, 2013, 11:00 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/ 
crime-and-courts/four-month-atf-operation-in-st-louis-yields-arrests-seizures/article_42e103 
ee-7fd8-51ec-85b6-b4a87ba9f13e.html [https://perma.cc/ES6R-WVVQ]. 
 121. Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Weapons Offenses and Offenders:  
Firearms, Crime, and Criminal Justice 2 (Nov. 12, 1995), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty= 
pbdetail&iid=711 [https://perma.cc/JE22-G2XP]. 
 122. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 450 (2003). 
 123. Id.  The two categories of crimes with larger percentages of black defendants 
convicted were robbery (64 percent) and drug trafficking (55 percent). Id.  The percentage 
for manslaughter was also 54. Id. 
 124. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, http://www.albany.edu/ 
sourcebook/pdf/t5452004.pdf [https://perma.cc/94FH-7ABE].  The 2002 statistics 
demonstrate a similar pattern—50 percent of defendants convicted for weapons charges were 
black, as compared to 43 percent for drug offenses, and 37 percent for all offenses.  See id. 
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were serving time in prison for weapons charges, as compared to 13,900 
Hispanic inmates, and 11,200 white inmates.125 
While perhaps not reflective of national demographics, the data for New 
York City paint an even starker picture.  In 2012, only 4.2 percent of the 
3287 individuals arrested for firearms charges were white; 73.2 percent 
were black, and 21.5 percent were Hispanic.126  In 2013, of 2915 arrestees, 
69.3 percent were black, 21.6 percent were Hispanic, and 8.6 percent were 
white.127  Further, these statistical disparities resonate with empirical 
examinations of the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk policing campaigns.128 
In 2003, Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies published a study that focused 
on the use of stop-and-frisk and “gun-oriented” policing tactics in New 
York City.129  For the previous decade, the NYPD had pursued an 
aggressive set of strategies that focused on “two related problems:  social 
and physical disorder and gun violence.”130  The combination of broken-
windows or “order maintenance policing” and the concern for directly 
curbing gun violence yielded a mode of policing in which officers 
frequently stopped and frisked individuals.131  In their study, Fagan and 
Davies examined the racial consequences of these tactics, breaking down 
stops according to both the alleged criminal conduct being investigated and 
the race of the stopped individual.132  They compared four different offense 
types:  (1) violent; (2) property; (3) drugs; and (4) weapons.133  Using arrest 
rates per 100,000 New Yorkers, regression analysis, and stop-to-arrest 
ratios, Fagan and Davies found that “[f]or weapons [offenses], the arrest 
rates for African Americans is five times higher than the rate for whites and 
three times higher than the rate for Hispanics.”134  In short, the stop-and-
frisk strategy produced a system in which police arrested people of color at 
 
 125. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2014 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf [https://perma.cc/K333-EMZ4].  BJS only considered individuals 
serving more than one year in prison. 
 126. RAYMOND W. KELLY, CRIME AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY IN NEW YORK CITY 12 
(2012), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/2012_year_ 
end_enforcement_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG7D-HJMB]. 
 127. WILLIAM J. BRATTON, CRIME AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY IN NEW YORK CITY 12 
(2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/2013_year_ 
end_enforcement_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CUF9-EU3C]. 
 128. Jeffrey A. Fagan & Garth Davies, Policing Guns:  Order Maintenance and Crime 
Control in New York, in GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, supra note 13, at 191–
221. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 193. 
 131. See id. at 193–95.  On broken-windows policing, see generally Bernard E. Harcourt, 
Reflecting on the Subject:  A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the 
Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 291, 342 (1998); James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows:  The Police 
and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ 
archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/8C9U-MXGB]. 
 132. See Fagan & Davies, supra note 128, at 199–209. 
 133. Id. at 202. 
 134. Id. 
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greater rates than whites.135  And, most notably for our purposes, weapons 
charges show the greatest racial disparity—even higher than the rates for 
drug offenses.136 
But it is not just the arrest rates that are significant.  Fagan and Davies’s 
data suggest that the ratio of stops to arrests is much higher in cases where 
officers were searching for weapons.137  Among black people stopped 
between 1997 and 1999, for example, the ratio of stops to arrests for 
weapons crimes was 20.08, as compared to 7.03 for violent crimes, 7.04 for 
property, and 6.94 for drugs.138  That is, stop-and-frisk tactics clearly led to 
many stops that did not produce evidence of a crime, but stops conducted 
on the basis of suspicion of weapons possession appear to have operated as 
more of a dragnet, turning up less criminal activity but yielding more 
confrontations with civilians. 
Notably, this disparity between weapons offenses is even greater for 
black defendants than for white and Hispanic defendants.139  Whereas the 
stop-to-arrest ratios for violent, property, and drug crimes across the three 
racial groups are roughly similar, the stop-to-arrest ratio for weapons is 
substantially higher for black stopees (20.08, as compared to 16.74 for 
Hispanic stopees and 15.89 for white stopees).140  Further, the 2014 
National Academy of Sciences report identified this dynamic in the stop-
and-frisk context, noting that “studies show that blacks who are stopped and 
frisked are less likely than whites to be in possession of guns or other 
contraband and are no more likely to be arrested.”141 
If concerns about racial disparity have driven the critiques of the War on 
Drugs, then it appears that they should factor into discussions about the 
criminal regulation of gun possession too.  Certainly, scholars have yet to 
produce statistical evidence that is as comprehensive as that cited in drug 
war criticisms.  Further, it is important to acknowledge a key distinction 
between the sets of data discussed here and those mentioned in Part I.A142 
and examined by other drug war critics:  we do not know how these arrest 
and conviction rates relate to actual commission of offenses.  That is, part 
of the power of the drug arrest and conviction statistics is the evidence that 
suggests that the rates reflect disparate enforcement, rather than disparate 
criminality.143  We know that white people engage in illicit drug use, but 
 
 135. The next section on policing addresses at greater length the relationship between 
stop-and-frisk and the criminal regulation of gun possession. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 136. See Fagan & Davies, supra note 128, at 202. 
 137. See id. 
 138. Id.  The ratios that Fagan and Davies produced in their study reflect the ratio 
between stops for given conduct and arrests resulting from such stops. Id. at 202–04.  That 
is, the weapons number reflects the ratio of stops motivated by a weapons investigation (i.e., 
where an officer was looking for weapons) and arrests resulting from those stops. Id. 
 139. See id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 24, at 123 n.22. 
 142. See supra notes 29–29 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text. 
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are less likely to face criminal consequences.144  Without data about who 
owns, possesses, or carries guns illegally, we simply do not know whether 
the same disparate enforcement dynamic is at work, or whether the numbers 
for arrests and convictions accurately reflect the demographics of illegal 
gun possession.145 
But the prevalence of felon-in-possession statutes and the close 
relationship between antigun and antidrug initiatives suggests that criminal 
regulation of gun possession may well reinscribe the inequalities of the drug 
war.146  That is, to the extent that the War on Drugs has led to more people 
of color with felony convictions,147 a system of gun control that requires 
mandatory minimum prison terms for felons risks sending the same 
individuals to prison for extended sentences.  Because of this dynamic, it 
may be that rates of illegal gun possession actually are reflected (at least to 
a certain extent) in the racial disparity in convictions for gun possession 
crimes.148  While such a situation clearly would be distinguishable from the 
selective enforcement in the drug context, this distinction should not 
necessarily resolve distributional concerns.  Defining a crime is a political 
act, and the decision that an individual with a criminal record for drug 
offenses cannot possess a gun lawfully rests on a political definition not 
only about guns, but about drugs as well.  We cannot (or should not) look at 
guns in a vacuum as divorced from other areas of a criminal justice system 
plagued by inequality.  What makes a specific instance of gun possession 
criminal may be the criminal history of a defendant, meaning that felon-in-
possession laws are embedded in a broader range of decisions about 
criminal law and its enforcement. 
Further, the statistics that we do have indicate that gun possession 
offenses serve as a space to empower police and to exacerbate the dynamics 
of broken windows and stop-and-frisk.149  In a system of hyper-policing,150 
 
 144. See generally supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Fagan & Davies, supra note 128, at 202.  Fagan and Davies concede that “these 
differences beg the question of differential offending rates, and the true offending rate may 
be unknowable.” Id. 
 146. See, The State of Civil and Human Rights in the United States, Senate Judiciary 
Committee, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights (Dec. 9, 
2014) (Written Testimony of Julie Stewart, President and Founder of Families Against 
Mandatory Minimums), http://famm.org/read-our-testimony-to-the-u-s-senate-subcommittee 
-on-the-constitution-civil-rights-and-human-rights/ (“Black offenders constitute a majority of 
offenders who qualify for the Armed Career Criminal Act’s 15-year mandatory minimum 
penalty (63.7%) and of offenders who remain subject to its mandatory minimum penalty at 
sentencing (63.9%).  White and Hispanic offenders, by comparison, constitute only 29.5 
percent and 5.2 percent of offenders who qualify for the Armed Career Criminal Act’s 15-
year mandatory minimum penalty, respectively.”) [https://perma.cc/AZN2-HHBF]. 
 147. See generally Part I.A. 
 148. Cf. Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and Federal Criminal Enforcement Power, 123 
YALE L.J. 2236, 2297 (2014) (describing “illegal gun possession, particularly by those 
already involved in the criminal justice system,” as “a norm of street life” in some lower-
income urban communities). 
 149. See generally supra notes 129–40. 
 150. Scholars have identified broken windows policing and other aggressive enforcement 
mechanisms in specific communities as “hyper-policing.” See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, 
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any category of offenses that empowers police to search also raises 
questions of racial biases (implicit or explicit).  Indeed, in the early 1990s, 
James Q. Wilson, the father of broken-windows policing,151 endorsed the 
use of stop-and-frisk tactics to combat illegal guns, but—in so doing—
explicitly conceded that such a system would have a disparate impact:  
“Innocent people will be stopped.  Young black and Hispanic men will 
probably be stopped more often than older white Anglo males or women of 
any race.”152  To Wilson, the distributive consequences of using aggressive 
criminal regulation of gun possession were clear, but worth it.153  The costs 
of gun crime—particularly the costs of gun crime in low-income urban 
communities of color—are undoubtedly high.  But—as in the context of 
crack cocaine—the very real presence of danger might not justify any 
policy response.  The War on Drugs has helped to drive home the 
significance of the race-based costs of widespread criminalization and 
criminal enforcement.  In order to conclude—like Wilson does—that these 
costs are justified in the gun possession context, we must address the racial 
costs of the current regime and of further criminal regulation of gun 
possession.154 
B.  The Role of Police and Prosecutors 
While scholars have criticized the War on Drugs as a locus for the 
aggrandizement of police and prosecutorial power,155 these critiques have 
gained less traction in the context of criminal regulation of gun 
possession.156  I have already addressed the civil libertarian concerns in the 
 
Regulating Sexual Harm:  Strangers, Intimates, and Social Institutional Reform, 102 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1553, 1577 (2014); Robert J. Sampson, When Things Aren’t What They Seem:  
Context and Cognition in Appearance-Based Regulation, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 97, 103 
(2012). 
 151. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 131. 
 152. James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 20, 1994), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/20/magazine/just-take-away-their-guns.html?pagewanted 
=all [https://perma.cc/8JEU-MYJ9]. 
 153. Id.  For a critique of Wilson’s argument and his casual acceptance of the racial 
consequences of his proposal, see generally Adina Schwartz, “Just Take Away Their Guns”:  
The Hidden Racism of Terry v. Ohio, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 317 (1996). 
 154. See James Forman, Jr., The Society of Fugitives, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/10/the-society-of-fugitives/379328/ 
(“Now that this war [on drugs] has become a damaged brand, the measures have been 
repackaged and resold as part of a war on guns.  Thus, during the recent debate over New 
York City’s stop-and-frisk policy, then-police chief Raymond Kelly argued that aggressive 
stop-and-frisk tactics ‘take guns off the street and save lives.’  Opponents countered 
(correctly) that armed offenders are the exception, even in low-income minority 
neighborhoods, and that it is a mistake to police all blacks as if they were high-rate 
offenders.”) [https://perma.cc/X8K3-76J8]. 
 155. See supra notes 55–73 and accompanying text. 
 156. But see David T. Hardy & Kenneth L. Chotiner, The Potential for Civil Liberties 
Violations in the Enforcement of Handgun Prohibition, in RESTRICTING HANDGUNS, supra 
note 116, at 194, 194–215; David B. Kopel, Peril or Protection?  The Risks and Benefits of 
Handgun Prohibition, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 285, 320–23 (1993). 
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drug war context,157 so this section examines the potential applicability of 
those same critiques in the gun context. 
1.  Police Power 
From a policing standpoint, possessory drug crimes allow for the sort of 
aggressive and interventionist preventative policing discussed in the prior 
section.158  In his paean to stop-and-frisk as the cure for gun violence, 
Wilson not only conceded the troubling racial politics of his proposal,159 
but also embraced a broadly aggressive and interventionist view of 
policing: 
Each patrol officer can be given a list of people on probation or parole 
who live on that officer’s beat and be rewarded for making frequent stops 
to insure that they are not carrying guns.  Officers can be trained to 
recognize the kinds of actions that the Court will accept as providing the 
“reasonable suspicion” necessary for a stop and frisk.  Membership in a 
gang known for assaults and drug dealing could be made the basis, by 
statute or Court precedent, for gun frisks.  And modern science can be 
enlisted to help. . . .  What is needed is a device that will enable the police 
to detect the presence of a large lump of metal in someone’s pocket from 
a distance of 10 or 15 feet.  Receiving such a signal could supply the 
officer with reasonable grounds for a pat-down.  Underemployed nuclear 
physicists and electronics engineers in the post-cold-war era surely have 
the talents for designing a better gun detector.160 
Wilson’s proposal for a gun detector may sound far-fetched, but we should 
not discount the significance of its underlying rationale.  He had identified a 
major threat to public safety—gun violence—and determined that one 
important component of the threat was the ubiquity of unlicensed or 
unlawfully possessed guns.161  Wilson even conceded that enforcing gun 
laws might disproportionately affect men of color.162  But the structure of 
Wilson’s argument appears to take for granted the sorts of civil libertarian 
concerns outlined in Part I.B. 
The implication of Wilson’s embrace of aggressive and intrusive 
surveillance and policing is that the societal benefits of reducing gun 
violence substantially outweigh any possible concerns about privacy or 
state power.  But the failure to mention these concerns also suggests that 
they simply did not rank very high on Wilson’s order of priorities.  My 
intention here is not to venture further into Wilson’s oeuvre or to make this 
section about one scholar and his views on crime, police, and policing.  
 
 157. See supra Part I.B. 
 158. See supra notes 129–53 and accompanying text. 
 159. See supra notes 151–53 and accompanying text. 
 160. Wilson, supra note 152.  In repeatedly invoking Wilson and his support for strong 
enforcement of criminal gun possession statutes, I in no way mean to suggest that all 
supporters of criminal gun control mechanisms share Wilson’s views or his priorities.  On 
the contrary, much of my contention in this Article rests on the premise that many supporters 
of criminal gun control statutes do not share Wilson’s ideological and political priors. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id.; see also supra notes 151–53 and accompanying text. 
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Rather, by highlighting Wilson’s priorities in this single, short piece from 
1994, I mean to emphasize the tension between the view of law 
enforcement that Wilson endorsed and the skeptical view that has come to 
dominate many critiques of the War on Drugs:  to Wilson, preventing crime 
justified racially disparate intrusions on civil liberties; to drug war critics, 
the social costs of enforcement might be as great as the costs of crime.163  
Notably, Wilson has argued elsewhere that “real progress in reducing gun 
violence almost certainly requires methods—aggressive patrolling, 
undercover operations, tougher sentences—that liberals instinctively 
dislike.”164  It may be that Wilson is wrong that his favored criminal 
solutions to gun violence are the best (or only) solutions to the social 
scourge of gun violence.  But he certainly is right to note the illiberal nature 
of the remedy.  Gun control proponents might conclude—as Wilson 
does165—that the benefits of an aggressive criminal regulatory approach to 
gun possession trump any costs.  And it is important to note that many of 
the particularly aggressive criminal regulation schemes arose in response to 
deadly waves of gun violence.166  But a theory of criminal law and law 
enforcement consistent with the civil libertarian critiques raised in the drug 
context should require a much more nuanced cost-benefit analysis that takes 
seriously the growing power of police and the potential risks to individual 
liberties.167 
In practice, the policing of gun possession raises many of the same 
concerns as the policing of drug possession.  Indeed, in scholarly literature, 
judicial opinions, and political rhetoric, drugs and violent gun crime are 
often treated as inextricably tied.168  In her recent account of the 
relationship between drugs and violence, Shima Baradaran Baughman 
argues that the perceived nexus between drugs and violence has served as a 
driving force for much of the draconian legal treatment of drugs and drug 
users.169  This rhetorical link between drug crime and violent crime has 
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 164. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 265 (rev. ed. 1983). 
 165. See id.; Wilson, supra note 152. 
 166. See, e.g., Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Public Policy Perspectives:  Principles for 
Effective Gun Policy, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 604 (2004). 
 167. See Hardy & Chotiner, supra note 156, at 194 (“[M]any committed civil libertarians 
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national handgun confiscation effort.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993); United States v. Carter, 
669 F.3d 411, 419 (4th Cir. 2012); Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. 
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 169. See generally Baradaran, supra note 168.  It is worth noting that many scholars and 
commentators have argued—consistent with Baradaran’s claim—that the causal chain 
between guns and violence runs counter to the narrative endorsed by drug prohibitionists.  
Instead of claiming that drugs and the drug trade are inherently violent and therefore must be 
criminalized, these scholars contend that it is criminalization itself that has spawned the 
violence and danger that permeates the drug trade. See, e.g., Steven B. Duke, Drug 
Prohibition:  An Unnatural Disaster, 27 CONN. L. REV. 571, 575 (1995); Erik Grant Luna, 
Our Vietnam:  The Prohibition Apocalypse, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 483, 554 (1997) (“Would 
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effectively elided the distinction, practically rendering it moot.170  For 
example, courts frequently allow the presence of a gun to trigger an 
inference that a defendant who possessed drugs was engaged in higher-level 
drug dealing.171 
The focus on the nexus between drugs and violence, therefore, should be 
critical to our understanding of the relationship between guns and drugs in 
the policing context.  As discussed above, critics of the War on Drugs have 
accurately identified an erosion in Fourth Amendment rights brought about 
by judicial deference to law enforcement officers in drug contexts.172  But it 
is important to recognize that the perceived violence of the drug trade has 
shaped these pro-police decisions—a concern for “officer safety” underlies 
courts’ endorsement of intrusive and aggressive policing.173  While courts 
refer to the dangers of drugs and the social importance of squelching drug 
 
drug legalization prevent the crime, violence, and corruption?  This author answers with an 
emphatic ‘yes.’”); Jeffrey A. Miron, Violence, Guns, and Drugs:  A Cross-Country Analysis, 
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Bruce L. Benson, Rationalizing Drug Policy Under Federalism, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 679, 
706 (2003) (“Violence in drug markets is often used as an argument for enforcement, but the 
fact that drug markets are illegal means that commercial disputes must be resolved outside 
the courts, with threatened or actual violence being the principal means for resolution.  In 
fact, the use of violence to settle disputes in these markets appears to be an inevitable 
consequence of any policy except legalization.” (footnotes omitted)); Daniel Robelo, 
Demand Reduction or Redirection?  Channeling Illicit Drug Demand Towards a Regulated 
Supply to Diminish Violence in Latin America, 91 OR. L. REV. 1227, 1250 (2013) (“[D]rug 
prohibition remains a central cause of organized crime and violence in the Americas . . . .”). 
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1990) (stating that guns are “generally considered . . . tool[s] of the trade for drug dealers”). 
 172. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
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Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); United States v. Collier, 419 F. App’x 682, 685 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (“At the suppression hearing, Stucker testified regarding his knowledge ‘that 
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for heightened concern for officer safety.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Maddox, 388 
F.3d 1356, 1365 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “a protective detention [is] justified on 
officer safety grounds” when there is a reasonable suspicion a person is a danger to those on 
the scene); United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that a 
reasonable suspicion of illegal drugs in a vehicle justifies a weapons search “to ensure the 
officer’s safety and the safety of others”); United States v. Menard, 95 F.3d 9, 10–11 (8th 
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to protect officer safety, regardless of whether there is also probable cause to arrest.”). 
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use,174 the critical language that the courts deploy is one of safety and 
security—not just for the public, but also for the officer. 
My claim relates to Baradaran Baughman’s—many of the erosions and 
carve-outs in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which are frequently 
attributed to the War on Drugs, are actually traceable directly to the 
criminal regulation and policing of firearms.175  The judicially created 
“drug exception to the Constitution”176 finds root in a set of assumptions 
about drugs and violence.  More specifically (but perhaps less explicitly), it 
relies on assumptions about the relationship between guns and the drug 
trade and about the sorts of people who use and deal drugs.177  The 
operative concern that has shaped the judicial expansion of police powers in 
the drug context is not only deference to legislative determinations about 
drugs and their danger, but also fear for officer safety in communities and 
contexts in which guns might be ubiquitous. 
Indeed, as noted in the stop-and-frisk context, it was guns as much, if not 
more so, than drugs that justified the aggressive and intrusive practice.178  
Additionally, modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence finds its roots in 
the context of possessory gun offenses.179  Even as the Warren Court was 
expanding the protections afforded to criminal defendants and curbing 
police abuses,180 it relied on the concern for officer safety in the gun 
possession context to carve out what would become the critical exception to 
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and 
seizures.181 
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 179. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and 
Effectiveness of New York City “Stop and Frisk”, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1540 (2014); 
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In Terry v. Ohio,182 a case involving the unlawful carrying of a concealed 
firearm, the Supreme Court authorized a class of warrantless searches and 
carved out an exception to the newly expanded exclusionary rule, laying the 
groundwork for contemporary police practices.183  Specifically, the Court 
held that a search was “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment when 
a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to 
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and 
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently 
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this 
behavior[,] . . . nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to 
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for 
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully 
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to 
discover weapons which might be used to assault him.184 
Predating the declaration of the War on Drugs, then, Terry and its logic 
remain clearly rooted in the fear of violence that guns produce.  The Court’s 
calculus does not require a broader examination of gun violence in society 
or of the broader state interest in regulating gun possession.  Rather, the 
Court’s focus in Terry and its progeny remained on the officer’s safety. 
We can trace this enforcement dynamic and its similarity to drug policing 
to the peculiarity of possession offenses.  Indeed, the two Fourth 
Amendment cases decided alongside Terry—Sibron v. New York185 and 
People v. Peters186—both dealt with the issues of proxy or possession 
crimes.  In Peters, an off-duty officer apprehended a suspect who he 
thought had tried to break into an apartment and searched him, ultimately 
recovering burglary tools.187  In Sibron, an officer stopped and frisked a 
suspect who he thought might be selling drugs and found bags of heroin.188  
Not only was the Court concerned with officer safety, but it also confronted 
the enforcement of possessory proxy crimes.189  The combination of the 
preoccupation with officer safety and the presence of possessory offenses 
means that an officer’s suspicions can quickly trigger not only questioning, 
but a search.  And how does an officer form such suspicions?  Absent 
random searches or searches based on some sort of bias, it is not entirely 
clear.  For possessory crimes, one of the primary concerns from a civil 
libertarian perspective remains the lack of external indicators.  In fact, the 
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 187. See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 48. 
 188. See id. at 45. 
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search itself becomes the core mechanism for the enforcement of 
possessory crimes. 
An essay originally published in 1976 bemoaning the lack of civil 
libertarian critiques of gun control highlighted this very dynamic: 
[T]he keeping of marijuana or a handgun in home, office, auto, or on the 
person is virtually impossible to detect except by searching those things.  
In general, the Fourth Amendment allows such searches only if there is 
probable cause to believe contraband will be found.  But if ownership of 
the banned item is sufficiently widespread, and/or the incentive to acquire 
sufficiently great, the number of searches that can legally be made will 
simply not be enough to deter continued violation.  To give the ban any 
chance of substantial success, the police must use random or other illegal 
searches, which it is hoped can provide enough evidence against enough 
violators so that they can be convicted and severely enough punished to 
frighten the unapprehended majority of violators into voluntary 
compliance.190 
Forty years later, these critiques are no more prevalent than in the 1970s, 
but they remain pertinent.  The same elements of drug possession that make 
it a crime that invites intrusive policing—difficulty to detect, prevalence of 
offense, and lack of easily identifiable victim—are similarly present in the 
case of gun possession.191  The point is not that most people own guns, or 
that most gun owners own their guns illegally.192  Rather, the issue is what 
enforcement of gun possession statutes looks like.  Because the crimes do 
not require any conduct outside of pure possession,193 they raise a puzzle 
for police—how to identify and weed out misconduct that might have no 
outward indicators or manifestations.  An individual might keep an arsenal 
of unlicensed guns in her home, but unless she displays one publicly, fires 
one, or in some way makes others aware of her guns, how can police find 
out about the weapons?  This was, of course, the conundrum that Wilson 
addressed by advocating widespread stops.194 
The concern about invasions of privacy or, more specifically, invasions 
of the home or private property might serve as a rallying cry for gun rights 
advocates and voices on the libertarian Right.  If the only way to detect 
possessory gun violations is for the state to invade, to inspect, and to 
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intrude, don’t these statutes fly in the face of the Enlightenment principles 
animating the Bill of Rights?  Viewed through this lens, gun possession—
like drug possession—serves as a public welfare offense that threatens the 
public/private distinction by inviting state intrusion into private spaces like 
the home, the vehicle, and the person.195 
But this line of criticism only gets us so far.  Given that this Article aims 
to address drug war critics, many of whom align with the political Left, a 
property-rights-based critique of gun-centric policing probably offers 
limited appeal.  Certainly, gun and drug possession crimes may undermine 
the public/private distinction, but the concerns about the War on Drugs 
traced in Part I were hardly premised on a property-rights-centric world 
view.196  These shared critiques of possessory gun and drug offenses may 
prove compelling to many who already oppose both gun control and drug 
prohibition,197 but if our goal is to construct a broader critical paradigm 
from attacks by the Left on the War on Drugs, then we need to dig beyond 
the sanctity of the home or private property.198 
Central to this project is stripping away the cultural and political coding 
in which discussions of criminal law and criminalization have become 
embedded.  That is, the purpose of the frame established in Part II is to 
suggest that the same critiques that have been embraced in one context 
might have real bite in the context of a legal debate with very different 
political valence.199  In the gun context, a look back at Terry, stop-and-
frisk, and the distributive consequences of policing suggests that enforcing 
gun possession statutes raises concerns beyond property rights, concerns 
that have rightly gained ground in the context of the War on Drugs. 
In one of the few scholarly works to examine the peculiar properties of 
possessory crimes, Markus Dubber has compared the broad class of 
offenses to vagrancy statutes—generally applicable laws that raise the 
specter of unrestrained policing and the state preying on the powerless.200  
In Dubber’s narrative, possessory crimes function as a dragnet of sorts, 
granting the state a broad legal authorization for criminal social control.201  
Possessory offenses do not address harm directly; rather, they target risks 
that might ultimately grow into harms.202  They are a proxy for past, future, 
or ongoing criminality.  If the state seeks to identify and incarcerate 
 
 195. See Dubber, supra note 10, at 849–55. 
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individuals suspected of posing a greater risk to public safety, then criminal 
statutes that allow for more stops, more searches, and more arrests provide 
an ideal weapon in the War on Crime.203  These offenses become 
emblematic of an expansive approach to criminalization and law 
enforcement: 
So broad is the reach of possession offenses, and so easy are they to detect 
and then to prove, that possession has replaced vagrancy as the sweep 
offense of choice.  Unlike vagrancy, however, possession offenses 
promise more than a slap on the wrist.  Backed by a wide range of 
penalties, they can remove undesirables for extended periods of time, 
even for life.  Also unlike vagrancy, possession offenses so far have been 
insulated against constitutional attack, even though they too break 
virtually every law in the book of cherished criminal law principles.204 
Viewed through this lens, possessory gun offenses by their nature reinscribe 
the power dynamics, prejudices, and suspicions that have led critics to 
decry drug policing. 
Searching for guns—like searching for drugs—can easily become 
pretextual, a proxy for some general prediction of risk, danger, or 
lawlessness.  As discussed above, the data compiled by Fagan and Davies 
show that, in the late 1990s, NYPD officers used alleged weapons 
violations as the justification for many stops.205  Further, the data show that 
these stops resulted on average in markedly fewer arrests than stops for 
other crimes.206  Taking their study in conjunction with both Dubber’s 
theory and the broader critical literature on predictive policing, we might 
well conclude that the policing of possessory gun crime looks a great deal 
like what Wilson hoped for and what critics should fear.207  Many searches 
yield little evidence of wrongdoing but increase a system of hyper-policing 
for individuals (particularly men of color) who are deemed “suspicious.”208 
Just as police in the drug context have been empowered to fight a war 
against the citizenry, in the gun context, officers now operate in a space in 
which they are trained to view citizens as armed—potential threats not only 
to the public, but also to the officers’ personal safety.209  Certainly, guns 
pose a direct threat to officers that drugs simply do not.210  And guns 
clearly possess a closer tie to violence and immediate third-party harms.  
But if we were concerned about the escalation of a war mentality and a 
proliferation of potentially violent confrontations between police and 
civilians in the drug context, then we cannot discount possessory gun crime 
 
 203. See William J. Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the 
Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 853 (2001). 
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 209. See generally United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462–63 (10th Cir. 1993) 
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as a space that has yielded both massive judicial deference to officers and 
also a normalization of officer force. 
2.  Prosecutorial Discretion 
Despite widespread support from the political Left, the criminal 
regulation of firearms reflects many of the general properties associated 
with the harsh turn in criminal sentencing that accompanied the War on 
Crime.  While mandatory minimum sentences that empower prosecutors in 
the plea bargaining process are common across criminal gun possession 
statutes,211 two specific antigun measures warrant particular attention212—
the Armed Career Criminal Act213 (ACCA) and Virginia’s “Project 
Exile.”214  Both target unlawful gun possession and impose strict penalties 
on bad actors (i.e., individuals with criminal histories) who possess 
firearms.215 
Originally enacted in 1984,216 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (where ACCA is 
codified) operates as both a three-strikes sentencing provision and a “felon-
in-possession” statute.  Pursuant to the statute, a criminal defendant is 
subject to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum prison sentence if:  (1) she 
violates the federal gun possession provision set forth in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g); and (2) has three prior convictions for “a violent felony or a 
serious drug offense, or both.”217  Subsection (c) of the same statutory 
provision also sets forth a series of sentence enhancements for the use or 
possession of a gun during the commission of “any crime of violence or 
drug trafficking crime.”218  While greater sentences accrue if the defendant 
fired the gun or brandished it, merely “carrying” or “possessing” the gun 
leads to a five-year mandatory minimum sentence.219  Further, these 
mandatory minimum sentences under § 924(c) must be served 
consecutively, or “stacked,” so that a single incident can yield a massive 
mandatory minimum penalty.220 
Conceived over a decade later in Richmond, Virginia, Project Exile 
aimed to take advantage of harsh federal gun laws, such as ACCA and 
§ 924(c).221  This combined state/federal initiative “targeted gun violence in 
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the Richmond area by funneling all gun arrests made by state and local 
authorities to federal court, where, if at all possible, defendants were to be 
prosecuted under federal firearm statutes.”222  The two legal regimes 
operate in tandem to increase the ability of prosecutors to incarcerate more 
people for more time.  In fact, the Department of Justice’s “Project Safe 
Neighborhoods Tool Kit” encourages state prosecutors to use federal 
firearm statutes to pressure defendants to accept longer than usual state 
sentences.223 
In the drug context, critics have focused on the ways in which mandatory 
minimum sentences have encouraged plea bargaining and empowered 
prosecutors to control cases from start to finish.224  And ACCA and 
state/federal initiatives like Project Exile reflect the same dynamic.  A 
prosecutor’s ability to tack on an additional charge under ACCA creates a 
sentencing regime in which the gun-based enhancement can lead to a much 
longer prison term than can the underlying crime itself.225  That is, a 
prosecutor can “stack” charges—essentially employing multiple counts to 
address the same underlying conduct.226 
While ACCA, § 924(c), and Project Exile have received scholarly 
criticism,227 the link to the War on Drugs and its attendant critiques are less 
often a clear focal point.  Authors tend to focus on flawed statutory 
provisions, federalism concerns, or critiques endemic to these cases, rather 
than on broader systemic or structural concerns about the heavy punishment 
meted out for nonviolent crime.228  That is, in the scholarly discourse, these 
are statutes or programs that require some fine tuning, rather than a criminal 
regulatory regime with an underlying problem (or set of problems).  
Nevertheless, as charges pursuant to § 924(e) and § 924(c) have 
increased,229 judges have begun to voice their concern that the use of 
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mandatory minimum sentences in this context has led to prosecutorial 
overreach verging on miscarriages of justice. 
In Holloway v. United States,230 Judge John Gleeson, a former Assistant 
U.S. Attorney, delivered a scathing indictment of the prosecutorial practices 
that led to the defendant’s fifty-seven year sentence for armed robbery—
twelve years for the robbery and forty-five for the gun charges.231  The 
defendant turned down a plea deal that would have yielded a 130 to 147 
month prison sentence and, in so doing, exposed himself to an additional 
forty-six years of mandatory prison time.232  Judge Gleeson concluded that 
the case before him 
encapsulate[d] several of the problems that have plagued our federal 
criminal justice system in recent years.  Specifically, it is a window into 
(1)  the excessive severity of sentences, (2)  racial disparity in sentencing, 
and (3)  prosecutors’ use of ultraharsh mandatory minimum provisions to 
annihilate a defendant who dares to go to trial.233 
The prosecution had imposed a “trial penalty” on the defendant—“the 
price Holloway was required to pay for exercising his right to put the 
government to its burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
[was] 46 years in prison.”234  And the court had no option but to impose this 
sentence because the prosecution had opted to charge Holloway with three 
weapons counts—the law dictated that the sentences must be “stacked,” 
yielding the forty-five additional years.235 
While there are strong reasons to doubt the worth of such a sentencing 
scheme and the value of such a long sentence under either a retributivist or 
deterrence theory,236 the duration itself is not the issue.  A system that 
yields such lengthy sentences might certainly raise concerns,237 but it also 
raises important questions about the role of the prosecutor and her ability to 
shape single-handedly the contours of our criminal justice system.  As in 
the drug context, the presence not only of mandatory minimum sentences, 
but also of charges that can be identified many times over for a single 
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instance of illicit conduct raise significant problems.238  The prosecutor in 
Holloway was able to impose the massive trial penalty not only because of 
the steep mandatory minimum offenses, but also because of the ease with 
which multiple counts could be articulated.239 
Indeed, in the § 924 context (including both § 924(c) and ACCA), 
Holloway is not unique as a case in which:  (1)  the underlying unlawful 
conduct yielded less punishment than did the presence of a firearm; and 
(2)  the court bemoaned the role of prosecutorial discretion.240  In United 
States v. Ballard,241 the District Court stated that “[t]he distorting effects of 
mandatory minimum sentences [had] never [been] more evident” and 
decried the government’s desired result as “unconscionable” in a case 
where a trial penalty resulted in the defendant receiving a 601-month 
sentence, while his codefendant only received 168 months.242  In United 
States v. Harris,243 the Ninth Circuit noted that § 924(c) “removed the 
carefully circumscribed discretion granted to district courts . . . to consider 
possible mitigating circumstances” and urged Congress to reconsider its 
“harsh scheme of mandatory minimums sentences.”244  In United States v. 
Herbert,245 Judge Harold DeMoss, Jr., concurred in a Fifth Circuit § 924(c) 
case, but wrote separately to critique the “draconian” use of the statute.246  
Similarly, in United States v. Hunter,247 an Eighth Circuit § 924(c) case, 
Judge Myron Bright wrote a separate opinion 
to express [his] view that [the defendant’s] sentence, including his 
mandatory life sentence, is “out of this world.”  This case is yet “another 
example of a harsh sentence that is required for a non-violent crime in 
what now seems generally recognized as this country’s continuing but 
unsuccessful War on Drugs.”248 
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Judge Bright’s concurrence powerfully draws the relationship to the War 
on Drugs that is too little explored and criticized.  Nevertheless, it may be 
that the § 924(c) cases are less compelling as an entrée into the critique of 
gun possession crimes because they involve crimes other than the gun 
possession itself.  To appreciate the broader theoretical critique traced by 
Dubber and suggested by other critics of crime as social control,249 it might 
be more illustrative to focus on ACCA and the fixation on possession itself. 
The costs of ACCA’s possessory focus are evident perhaps most clearly 
in United States v. Young.250  In Young, 
Edward Young received a mandatory fifteen-year prison sentence for the 
crime of possessing seven shotgun shells in a drawer.  He came into 
possession of the shells while helping a neighbor sell her late husband’s 
possessions.  When he eventually discovered them, he did not realize that 
his legal disability against possessing firearms—resulting from felonies 
committed some twenty years earlier—extended to ammunition.  Under 
the [ACCA], Young received a mandatory fifteen-year sentence.251 
Whatever our preferred theory of punishment, Young’s spending over two 
years in prison for each shell certainly strains most conceptions of 
proportionality. 
On Appeal, Young argued that the conviction violated his Eighth 
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.252  He lost.253  
While the court conceded that “[t]he magnitude of Young’s crime was low, 
as was his culpability and motive,”254 the court went on to conclude that 
“Young’s recidivism, resulting from numerous felony convictions roughly 
twenty years prior to his present offense, increases the gravity of his 
offense.”255  Young, then, stands as a powerful illustration of the criminal 
law as a means of controlling populations and predicting dangerousness.  In 
some sense, the ACCA charge and conviction resembles a status crime 
rather than a conduct crime.  Young had been branded a bad actor—a threat 
to public safety—and, as such, was subject to the sort of harsh justice meted 
out by ACCA. 
It’s hard not to reflect on Dubber’s analogy of possessory offenses and 
vagrancy.256  By presenting official actors (i.e., police and prosecutors) with 
a powerful weapon to deploy against potential social deviants, ACCA 
provides a vehicle for preemptive policing (or, at the very least, policing by 
 
 249. See generally supra note 10; infra note 273. 
 250. 766 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 
 251. Id. at 623 (citation omitted). 
 252. See generally id.  Douglas Berman, a prominent criminal law scholar and critic of 
harsh sentencing in the drug context, argued on Young’s behalf. See Sixth Circuit to Hear 
Oral Argument on Extreme Application of ACCA in US v. Young, SENT’G L. AND POL’Y, 
(Mar. 12, 2014, 8:12 PM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/ 
2014/03/sixth-circuit-to-hear-oral-argument-on-extreme-application-of-acca-in-us-v-
young.html [https://perma.cc/B9WA-2U5U]. 
 253. Young, 766 F.3d at 630. 
 254. Id. at 627. 
 255. Id. at 628. 
 256. See supra notes 202, 206. 
2212 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
proxy).257  Whether we view this mechanism critically as a means of 
repression, or more positively as a vehicle for prevention, the fact remains 
that ACCA—like criminal drug statutes—serves as an area in which state 
actors may rely on their own intuition to determine who walks free and who 
spends a life behind bars. 
Further, it is important to recognize the relationship between the racial 
critique of gun possession statutes and prosecutorial discretion.  In 
Holloway, Judge Gleeson noted that prosecutorial discretion in the gun 
context not only raised concerns over incarceration, but also its 
distributional consequences258: 
Black men like Holloway have long been disproportionately subjected to 
the “stacking” of § 924(c) counts.  The Sentencing Commission’s Fifteen-
Year Report states that black defendants accounted for 48% of offenders 
who qualified for a charge under § 924(c), but they represented 56% of 
those charged under the statute and 64% of those convicted under it.259 
The troubling racial dynamics of prosecutorial discretion in the gun 
context is not confined to § 924 cases.  In United States v. Jones,260 the 
defendant brought a constitutional challenge to Project Exile, arguing that it 
violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law, 
both because it shifted cases into federal courts to decrease the number of 
black would-be jurors in the jury pool and because prosecutors selectively 
prosecuted black defendants.261  Specifically, the defendant emphasized 
that the jury pool for the city of Richmond was 75 percent black, while the 
jury pool for the Eastern District of Virginia was only 10 percent black, and 
that Assistant United States Attorneys admitted that they sought to “avoid 
‘Richmond juries.’”262  Despite rejecting the claims, the court “express[ed] 
its concern about the discretion afforded individuals who divert cases from 
state to federal court for prosecution under Project Exile.”263 
Indeed, the limited academic engagements with the racial disparity of 
gun prosecutions have focused on § 924 cases.  Sonja Starr and Marit 
Rehavi have noted that “the non-drug mandatory minimum that was the 
most common and the most responsible for driving sentencing disparities 
was the enhancement for crimes involving firearms, found in 18 U.S.C 
§ 924(c).”264  They go on to note that the “statute has particularly harsh 
penalties” and that “[p]rosecutors have considerable discretion in applying 
this statute, especially when the facts make the relationship of a gun to an 
offense ambiguous (for instance, when the gun is found in the defendant’s 
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car trunk).”265  Another critic notes that in districts such as the Eastern 
District of Michigan, Southern District of New York, and Southern District 
of Ohio, 90 percent of the prosecutions were against black defendants.266 
In short, the current statutory framework for criminal gun possession 
displays a disturbing overreliance on the discretion of prosecutors to 
identify who are the true bad actors and determine who deserves the full 
brunt of the state’s violence.  In this respect, the statutes discussed in this 
section mirror the worst elements of the War on Drugs, as well as the 
flawed mode of policing in both contexts.  Legal actors (courts and 
legislators) have deferred to law enforcers (police and prosecutors).  The 
War on Drugs and its attendant critiques have shown us the costs of this 
deference.  Similar deference in the gun context may well produce similar 
costs. 
C.  Driving Mass Incarceration 
Like criminal drug statutes, existing and proposed criminal gun 
possession statutes should also trigger skepticism from critics of mass 
incarceration.  If we are concerned about mass incarceration because of its 
social or economic costs, we should subject to close scrutiny any legislation 
that further ramps up punishment or potentially increases the number of 
individuals serving extended sentences.  While fewer people are 
incarcerated for possessory gun crimes than drug crimes, gun crimes play a 
substantial role in the current moment of mass incarceration.267  In 2012, 
for example, firearms charges accounted for 9.8 percent of all federal 
charges for which a defendant was sentenced.268  In 2013, of the 193,775 
sentenced inmates in federal custody, an estimated 30,000 (approximately 
15.5 percent) were incarcerated for weapons charges.269  This percentage, 
while substantially less than the percentage of federal inmates serving drug 
sentences (50.7 percent), was greater than any other specific class of federal 
crimes, including immigration offenses (9.9 percent) and violent crimes 
(7.0 percent).270  Further, between 1999 and 2011, firearms charges were 
the second leading cause for nonviolent life-without-parole sentences.271 
In a sense, then, this section follows directly from the discussion of 
mandatory minimum sentencing and ACCA in the context of prosecutorial 
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discretion.  As a category of criminal offenses defined by sentencing 
enhancements, mandatory minimum sentences, and predicting future 
threats, possessory gun crimes embody many of the reigning pathologies of 
criminal law.  As Dubber puts it, “[T]he point of [possession] offenses is 
the identification and neutralization of sources of danger, i.e., threats of 
threats.”272  In their focus on prevention, possession crimes in the gun 
context embrace incapacitation as a primary purpose of punishment.273 
These statutes illustrate the troubling duality that has come to define the 
contemporary moment in the U.S. criminal justice system.  On the one 
hand, the crimes are almost regulatory in nature,274 a version of “public 
welfare” offenses.275  Quintessential malum prohibitum offenses, 
possessory gun crimes ultimately serve as a means of regulating dangerous 
products just as much as (if not more so than) dangerous conduct.276  In this 
respect, gun possession statutes sound in the register of utilitarianism or 
some broader consequentialist ethos.  Largely divorced from discussions of 
mens rea, the statutes purport to serve as a vehicle (albeit an indirect one) 
for curbing gun violence.  On the other hand, these statutes carry with them 
the weight of substantial prison time.  In the broader context of three-strikes 
sentencing regimes and punitive, tough-on-crime politics, gun possession 
statutes bear the heavy mark of the sharply retributive turn that U.S. 
criminal justice policy took over the latter portion of the twentieth 
 
 272. Dubber, supra note 10, at 843. 
 273. See id. at 841–45.  “[T]he Model Code’s mechanisms for the early detection and 
diagnosis of correctional needs became a vast net of mass incapacitation. . . .  So, possession 
offenses were transformed from opportunities for early correctional intervention into 
opportunities for lengthy, perhaps permanent, incapacitation.” Id. at 992.  In this respect, 
these possessory offenses illustrate the incapacitationist turn that scholars have identified as 
comprising “the new penology.” See Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New 
Penology:  Notes on an Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 
CRIMINOLOGY 449, 449 (1992); see also Sharon Dolovich, Foreword:  Incarceration 
American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 252–54 (2009); Benjamin Levin, Inmates for 
Rent, Sovereignty for Sale:  The Global Prison Market, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 509, 553 
(2014). 
 274. See United States v. Young, 766 F.3d 621, 624 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that the 
defendant in an ACCA case “describes [the crime] as a mere technical violation of the 
statute” and “[c]ompar[es] his crime to overtime parking”). 
 275. See Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 67 
(1933). 
 276. Indeed, under many statutes, the manner in which or the purpose for which a 
defendant possesses the firearm in question has no bearing on her guilt or the sentence that 
she must serve. See Aya Gruber, Righting Victim Wrongs:  Responding to Philosophical 
Criticisms of the Nonspecific Victim Liability Defense, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 492 (2004).  
The only question for a prosecutor, a judge, or (in rare cases) a jury is generally whether the 
defendant possessed a gun to which she was not lawfully entitled. See Samuel L. Bray, 
Power Rules, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1172, 1187 (2010).  “How?”, “where?”, “when?”, and 
“why?” she possessed the gun may all be questions of great importance to a determination of 
moral culpability or social risk.  But they are wholly irrelevant to most of the legal 
frameworks that currently structure the criminal regulation of gun possession.  Put more 
simply, mens rea, the touchstone of much U.S. criminal law, largely drops out of the 
possession equation. See Dubber, supra note 10, at 859. 
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century.277  Therefore, these possessory gun crimes stand at once as 
markers of two concurrent, and seemingly inconsistent, trends in U.S. penal 
culture:  criminal law as the regulatory mechanism of choice and punitive, 
extended incarceration as the dominant form of punishment.  That is, the 
state governs through crime, stripping the criminal offense of many of its 
exceptional qualities;278 yet, the state punishes as though the criminal law 
remains exceptional, a space reserved for those who have violated the deep-
seated moral values of the community, rather than those who have fallen 
afoul of yet another legislative diktat. 
In this respect, the parallel to criminal drug statutes is compelling.  In the 
drug context, the use of criminal law to handle a public health crisis 
ultimately merged with a strong punitive streak, yielding a regulatory 
regime undergirded with violent moralism.  Shaped by this preference for 
incarceration, the criminal gun statutes in the federal system and in many 
states advance a web of exponentially advancing sentences.  Like drug 
crime offenses, possessory drug offenses quickly multiply, allowing 
prosecutors to stack charges and to extend significantly the prison term that 
a defendant faces.  The end result is a legal regime that—much like drug 
prohibition—feeds into a growing carceral population. 
III.  DIFFERENT CRIMES, SAME CRITIQUES? 
Are the critiques outlined in Part II meaningful, and, if so, what should 
that signify for discussions about the scope of criminal law and the criminal 
regulation of firearms?  If we take seriously the fears that have led to 
widespread scholarly condemnation of the War on Drugs, what should this 
tell us about the legal treatment of gun possession?  Perhaps, more 
generally, how might we imagine a legal architecture for gun regulation that 
avoids the pitfalls of the War on Drugs?  In an effort to answer these 
questions, this part focuses first on the theoretical issues with the 
application of the drug war critiques to gun possession and then address the 
alternative normative proposals or positions that my critiques might trigger. 
A.  Potential Limits to the Application 
Regardless of any possible similarities between the analyses in Parts I 
and II, staunch gun control advocates may remain unmoved by the parallels 
traced in this Article and may argue that the critiques of the War on Drugs 
have no real lesson to teach us about how to regulate gun possession.  
Support for stringent gun control has become deeply embedded in the 
contemporary liberal/progressive worldview and enjoys an important place 
 
 277. Indeed, it is worth noting that ACCA not only embeds the three-strikes provision in 
§ 924(e), but that § 924(c) includes a subsection that triggers an additional twenty-five year 
sentence for any repeat offender of the felon-in-commission provision. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(C) (2012). 
 278. See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 729 
(2005) (arguing that criminal law loses its “moral force” as an embodiment of cultural norms 
and condemnation when it becomes too widely used). 
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in the package of views generally shared by the U.S. Left.279  Additionally, 
support for gun control as a means of curtailing gun violence remains 
strong in black communities that have borne the brunt of the nation’s gun 
violence.280  While support for the War on Drugs has waned, and while 
those on the political Left have been some of the most vociferous critics of 
criminal drug policies,281 any argument that cuts against the grain of these 
deeply held beliefs about guns will presumably face strong opposition.282  
Put simply, to gun control advocates, guns are categorically different. 
In his work on “cultural cognition,” Dan Kahan has focused on the gun 
control debate and argued that the political divide on gun regulation cannot 
be understood on purely rational terms.283  “Whatever they say in public,” 
contends Kahan, “those involved in the gun control debate are not really 
motivated by beliefs about guns and crime. . . .  What does motivate them, a 
wealth of sociological and historical literature suggests, is their attachment 
to competing cultural styles that assign social meanings to guns.”284  
According to Kahan and other scholars of gun law and policy, attitudes 
toward guns are articles of faith, often deeply embedded in views of self 
and society. 
Further, to some, gun possession is too close to violence on a broader 
chain of causation and therefore must be treated as a violent crime in and of 
itself.  I argue that the legal treatment of guns and drugs should be rooted in 
a discussion of the best way to regulate markets in dangerous products, but 
it is important to recognize that all dangerous markets are not the same.  
Dangerous and deadly are not necessarily synonymous.  That is, while 
much of the current criticism of marijuana criminalization finds support in 
scientific evidence about the limited health risks of marijuana use, no such 
evidence exists to disprove the uncontested fact that guns are lethal 
weapons. 
This rationale finds purchase in the ACCA context, where courts have 
treated simple possession of certain types of guns to be “crimes of 
 
 279. See, e.g., WINKLER, supra note 13, at 196–98; Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition 
of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 451–61 (1999); Erik Luna, The .22 Caliber 
Rorschach Test, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 53, 64 (2002). 
 280. See generally Nicholas J. Johnson, Firearms Policy and the Black Community:  An 
Assessment of the Modern Orthodoxy, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1491 (2013) (characterizing a 
“modern orthodoxy” in many urban, black communities that supports strict gun regulations). 
 281. See generally supra Part I. 
 282. See generally Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 104–07 (2013); 
Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun Control, 
and the Fear of Cultural Politics:  Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55 EMORY L.J. 569 
(2006); David Jaros, Flawed Coalitions and the Politics of Crime, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1473, 
1482 (2014); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion:  A 
Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (2003); Kahan, supra 
note 279, at 451–62. 
 283. See generally Kahan, supra note 279, at 451–62. 
 284. Id. at 452; see also TUSHNET, supra note 13; Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Fact-
Free Gun Policy?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1329, 1329 (2003) (“[D]o facts actually affect gun 
policy in the real world?  Kahan and Braman argue, persuasively, that ‘cultural worldviews’ 
influence how individuals perceive gun control measures.  We are convinced.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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violence” sufficient to satisfy the statute’s residual clause.285  Indeed, in the 
oral argument for United States v. Johnson,286 the Supreme Court focused 
on this very proximity between possession and harm in considering the 
potential vagueness of ACCA’s residual clause.287  While the defendant 
contended that “merely possessing [a short-barreled shotgun] is a very far 
cry from using it in a crime,”288 much of the argument revolved around an 
implicit rejection of the harm principle.  The justices expressed little 
interest in any overt act by the defendant and instead sought to identify 
where possessing a short-barreled shotgun fell on the spectrum from 
possessing burglary tools (not violent)289 to nuclear weapons (violent).290  
Indeed, in his dissent from the Court’s opinion in Johnson, Justice Alito 
concluded that the defendant’s possession offense was a crime of violence 
because his “conduct posed an acute risk of physical injury to another.”291 
While it is important to note this general category of objections to the 
comparison of guns to drugs (i.e., gun possession is violent), it is unclear 
how far that line of reasoning can or should extend.  This was the challenge 
in the Johnson argument, and it should be a challenge for us as we look 
back at the War on Drugs.  If our focus is less on an act than the 
dangerousness of an item or substance, maybe that should cut against our 
use of “nonviolent drug offense” to describe possession or distribution of 
heroin, crack cocaine, methamphetamine, or other drugs known to have 
severe or even lethal health effects. 
We do not have a good theoretical framework or justification for when to 
abandon the harm principle and when to cease requiring an overt act.  
Ultimately, these may be questions for legislators rather than courts.  But if 
the government’s rationale in Johnson—a version of the guns/violence 
nexus critiqued by Baradaran Baughman292—is justifying the exceptional 
treatment of guns, then it is important for criminal law scholars to examine 
this justification.  Most importantly, if it applies to guns (or at least certain 
types of guns), then is there a limiting principle?  Or might it necessitate a 
broader embrace of the preventative theory of punishment critiqued by 
Dubber? 
Ultimately, whether guns are too closely aligned with violence and 
immediate third-party harms to be likened to (dangerous) narcotics, or 
whether guns remain culturally, rhetorically, or expressively distinct, the 
 
 285. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 526 F. App’x 708, 711 (8th Cir. 2013), rev’d 135 
S. Ct. 2551 (2015); United States v. Lillard, 685 F.3d 773, 776 (8th Cir. 2012); United States 
v. Marquez, 626 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Ristroph, supra note 257, at 604–10. 
 286. 526 F. App’x 708 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 287. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (No. 13-7120) (Justice 
Kagan:  “But if I understand the government’s argument, it’s that there’s a very strong 
correlation between possession in this case and use for criminal purposes of a kind that 
clearly would pose a risk of—of violent conduct and injury”). 
 288. Id. at 14. 
 289. See id. at 16. 
 290. See id. at 11. 
 291. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2584 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 292. See supra notes 168–75 and accompanying text. 
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comparative move made in Part II may not appeal to gun control 
proponents.  Nevertheless, accepting the line of reasoning advanced in this 
Article does not necessarily mean conceding that:  (1)  (all types of) guns 
are analogous to (all types of) drugs; (2)  private possession of any type of 
gun is socially beneficial; or (3)  gun ownership or increased gun ownership 
is normatively desirable.  That is, the applicability of drug war critiques to 
gun possession need not yield an explicitly “pro-gun” result or normative 
proposal.  Even if guns provided no social benefit and even if gun 
ownership were emblematic of a deeply flawed aspirational view of how 
society should function, that does not vitiate the salience of the critiques.  
Further, while some critiques of the War on Drugs may be predicated on a 
conclusion that drugs are not that harmful or dangerous, the critiques 
identified in Part I do not require such a conclusion.  In the strong form 
outlined above, these critiques rest largely on evaluations of the social costs 
of criminal regulation, rather than on some assessment of the relative worth 
of the regulated substances.293  To suggest that the “New Jim Crow” 
scholars are arguing that drugs are good or that drug use yields social 
benefits misses their commentary’s deeper structural critique. 
Indeed, the treatment of crack cocaine might provide a useful illustration 
to consider the case of gun possession.  Unlike marijuana, crack cocaine has 
enjoyed no social destigmatization.  It may be that the arguments that 
underpinned the 100:1 disparity have been discredited, but there has been 
no significant scholarly or public support for a noncriminal model of 
regulating crack.  That being said, the dangerous nature of the substance did 
not prevent a range of scholarly and judicial critiques of the sentencing and 
enforcement mechanisms of crack cocaine’s criminal treatment.294  And, 
the dangerous nature of the substance did not stop Congress from acting to 
remedy through the FSA295 (at least in part) the racial inequities of previous 
policies.  Crack addiction and the violence associated with the crack trade 
exacted massive tolls on poor communities of color—but so too did the use 
of criminal law to address these problems.296 
Therefore, if we take these criticisms seriously, we must be willing to 
confront their applicability to existing and proposed criminal regulations on 
gun possession.  If the arguments outlined in Part I make the War on Drugs 
so deeply unpalatable and unjust, then should we not be willing to consider 
criminal gun control through this critical lens?297  Criminal law may have 
 
 293. Drug war critics may weigh the costs and benefits of making drugs more widely 
available, but the critiques of the current legal framework of criminal prohibition frequently 
stand on their own; that is, the costs are so great that few benefits could conceivably 
outweigh them.  Or, even if criminal regulation might result from a careful balancing of 
costs and benefits, this balancing has been troublingly lacking from the legal and scholarly 
discourse surrounding criminal gun regulation. 
 294. See supra notes 34–42. 
 295. See supra notes 39–43. 
 296. See supra notes 34–42. 
 297. While I am focused primarily on gun possession statutes as an analog here, the logic 
of this Article extends further.  My claim is that criticism of the War on Drugs has 
highlighted structural flaws in the criminal justice system—flaws that persist outside of the 
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an important role to play in addressing gun violence.298  But the criminal 
statutes that regulate gun possession risk reproducing the same systemic 
pathologies, collateral costs, and distributional inequities that have defined 
the War on Drugs.  That harsh statutory punishment for unlawful gun 
possession might offer a range of social benefits does not render it immune 
from consideration of potential costs.  If we have identified the costs of 
regulating through crime, then these costs should become a part of all 
conversations about regulating through crime—not just conversations about 
drugs. 
Over the past decade, as the scholarly criticism of the War on Drugs has 
increased, scholarly treatments of gun regulation have often taken a 
different turn.299  Whereas the drug war criticisms reflect an embrace of 
realist or post-realist methodologies,300 the gun debate has enjoyed a 
formalist shift as scholars have focused on the language of the Second 
Amendment.301  In the drug context, scholars have devoted their efforts to 
examining the effects of the War on Drugs and to describing and testing 
possible legal alternatives.302  In the gun context, however, recent years 
have seen a shift away from studies of the law in action to careful 
examinations of the law on the books.303  Exemplified by the post-Heller 
and McDonald fascination with the original meaning of the Second 
Amendment, the focal point of many gun rights advocates and gun control 
proponents has become an ostensibly apolitical space of historical and 
textual interpretation.  Rather than examining the effects of various extant or 
proposed gun statutes, scholars and courts have become preoccupied with 
eighteenth-century views of gun ownership.304  Rather than focusing on the 
impact of possessory gun statutes on civil rights and liberties or on the 
 
drug context.  If these concerns have yielded such a compelling and stinging rebuke of U.S. 
drug policies, then shouldn’t scholars concerned about injustice in the criminal justice 
system be concerned about their relevance to other criminal regulatory regimes?  In this 
respect, gun possession statutes serve as a test case, rather than a one-off analogy.  It may be 
that the possessory aspect of both categories of laws makes the application particularly 
salient, but that does not mean that the critique should end here. 
 298. Cf. Husak, supra note 15, at 445 (“No one can dispute that the criminal law should 
play an important role in proscribing the harms caused by guns and drugs.  The use of a gun 
to wound, or the use of a drug to poison, unquestionably are and ought to be criminal acts.”). 
 299. See Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment Originalism and the 
Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1187, 1191 n. 27 (2015) 
(collecting sources). 
 300. See generally supra Part I. 
 301. See, e.g., THE SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL:  CRITICAL ESSAYS ON DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA V. HELLER (Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich eds., 2013). 
 302. See supra Part I.A; see also supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 303. See Zimring, supra note 110, at 39–40.  One reason for this shift may be the great 
impact that Second Amendment scholarship has had on the Court’s reasoning.  See Joseph 
Blocher, New Approaches to Old Questions in Gun Scholarship, 50 TULSA L. REV. 477, 478 
(2015) (expressing optimism about recent strands in gun scholarship). 
 304. See Joseph Blocher, Gun Rights Talk, 94 B.U. L. REV. 813, 825 (2014) 
(“[S]ometimes gun rights talk displays an almost adamant refusal to accept not the size or 
existence of externalities, but their relevance.  This imperviousness to public policy 
considerations finds some rhetorical support in Heller itself, as the majority appeared to 
indicate that the right to keep and bear arms is immune to considerations of social cost.”). 
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laws’ distributional consequences, scholars have become preoccupied with 
the Second Amendment. 
To put a finer point on it, the Second Amendment frame often obscures 
the practical realities of the criminal justice system.305  When all we 
consider is a right to bear arms and possible intrusions on that right, we lose 
perspective on the legal institutions that would both enforce that right and 
also might intrude on it.  In the context of prohibitionist tendencies against 
guns and drugs, this sort of conversation encourages a focus on whether the 
prohibited item is bad and whether society would be better without it, rather 
than on the legal mechanics—and consequences—of prohibition.  Legal 
philosopher and scholar of overcriminalization Douglas Husak 
characterizes this view as “the common mistake of supposing that the 
criminal law operates by preventing given forms of conduct.”306  As he puts 
it, 
If that [supposition] were so, the only substantive consideration that 
would be relevant to criminalization would be the value of the liberty that 
is lost when conduct is prohibited.  According to this supposition, 
questions about the legitimacy of the criminal sanction could be resolved 
by pretending that the state possessed a magic wand that could make all 
guns or drugs (for example) disappear.  In reality, of course, the criminal 
law functions quite differently; it proscribes, but may not prevent.307 
The state lacks a magic wand.  Instead, the state has criminal statutes, law 
enforcement officers, and the vast infrastructure of the criminal justice 
system. 
The challenge of addressing social problems and the reach of 
criminalization when faced with the “magic wand” frame has recurred 
throughout scholarly and political treatments of gun possession.  In a 1976 
collection of policy proposals, Crime and Punishment:  A Radical Solution, 
then-National Director of the ACLU Aryeh Neier included a chapter 
entitled, “Take Away All Guns.”308  In a book that includes proposals to 
decriminalize a range of sexual offenses and abandon many drug war 
policies, Neier identifies violent state intervention as the ideal solution to 
the problem of gun violence.309  Yet, in a concluding paragraph, Neier 
concedes his reliance on the frame that Husak would identify decades later: 
Elsewhere . . . I propose that the state do less.  Here, I want the state to do 
more.  I want the state to take away people’s guns.  But I don’t want the 
state to use methods against gun owners that I deplore when used in 
enforcement of laws against naughty children, sexual minorities, drug 
 
 305. That being said, it is worth noting that the Second Amendment may provide a 
defense to individuals charged with possessory gun crimes and may alter courts’ Fourth 
Amendment analysis. Cf. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (concluding that a state law allowing concealed carrying of firearms should have 
barred an officer’s search of a defendant). 
 306. Husak, supra note 15, at 469. 
 307. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 308. ARYEH NEIER, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT:  A RADICAL SOLUTION 62–71 (1976). 
 309. See generally id. 
2016] GUNS AND DRUGS 2221 
users, and unsightly drinkers.  Since such reprehensible police practices 
are probably needed to make antigun laws effective, my proposal to ban 
all guns should probably be marked a failure before it is even tried.310 
Past experience has shown us the realities of criminal intervention in social 
problems.  And past experience has led to a range of recognized critiques.  
So why pretend that there could be a magic wand when we are presented 
with a social problem that we find particularly pressing or an item, 
substance, or behavior that we find particularly reprehensible?311 
Given that there will still be gun regulation after Heller and McDonald, 
we must determine what such regulation should look like and which legal 
institutions should shape U.S. gun policy.312  “What will improve the gun 
debate at the top end of the policy community,” argues Franklin Zimring, 
one of the nation’s preeminent gun law scholars, “is careful attention to the 
differences between types and intensities of firearm regulation.”313  By 
resituating the discussion of criminal gun statutes in the frame of the drug 
war critiques, I hope to reemphasize these institutional dynamics and the 
legal architecture of criminal regulation. 
B.  What Happens Next? 
One challenge for a critical inquiry into the costs of possessory gun 
criminalization, or the broader use of flawed criminal statutes or policing 
techniques, is the practical advantage that criminal law often enjoys.  This 
tendency to favor increasingly harsh criminal law solutions embodies what 
Stuntz described as the “pathological politics” of criminal law.314  In the 
gun context, the story of criminal law’s prominence highlights 
criminalization as an easier alternative and easier space for bipartisanship. 
ACCA and Project Exile provide useful illustrations of this point.  Both 
pieces of “tough on crime” legislation represent compromises of a sort.  In 
popular and scholarly discourse, gun control generally is treated as a 
polarized issue that breaks down along predictable political lines.  Those on 
the political Left tend to support gun control, while those on the Right favor 
fewer restrictions on gun ownership.  But ACCA and Project Exile 
represent a compromise between a law-and-order Right and an antigun 
Left.315  For gun control proponents, these statutes represent not only a 
 
 310. Id. at 71 (emphasis added). 
 311. See Husak, supra note 15, at 438 (“The true test of our commitment to a theory is 
whether we are willing to accept its implications when we might prefer not to do so.”). 
 312. Based on the Supreme Court’s treatments of the other rights that have been 
incorporated against the states, it is implausible that the Court would hold that the right was 
absolute and that no gun regulation was constitutional. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008) (“[T]he Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not 
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes . . . .”). 
 313. Zimring, supra note 110, at 42. 
 314. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505 (2001). 
 315. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 4, at 143; Gary Fields, Going After Crimes—and Guns, 
WALL STREET J. (Aug. 5, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121789872887012221 
(“The National Rifle Association and the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence rarely 
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powerful public statement condemning the unlawful possession of guns, but 
also a rare moment of agreement with gun control opponents.316  While 
many gun rights advocates certainly may be absolutists in their opposition 
to regulation on gun ownership, the NRA and other opponents of gun 
control regulation have frequently made an exception for criminal statutes.  
These statutes reflect a popular motto of the NRA—“guns don’t kill people; 
people kill people.”317  That is, these statutes make regulating guns about 
targeting or identifying bad actors and punishing them, rather than directly 
regulating a product or market. 
As discussed above, there is reason to be suspicious of both programs 
based on their distributional effects and collateral costs.318  Such initiatives 
might curb gun violence or might allow for political action in a climate of 
polarization.  Further, these programs (like many other gun control 
measures) might enjoy strong support from the communities most affected 
by gun violence.  But for critics of the expanding criminal justice system, 
these bipartisan compromises should be a source of concern.  Tough-on-
crime initiatives remain tough-on-crime initiatives, regardless of their 
supporters’ motivations or good intentions.  In these compromises, the 
vulnerable groups that suffer directly from tough-on-crime policies (e.g., 
individuals with criminal records and young men of color in heavily policed 
areas)319 often do not have a seat at the bargaining table.320  The same sort 
of compromises that shaped U.S. drug policy and led to the mass 
incarceration and hyper-policing of entire communities pose the same risks 
to the same individuals who often find themselves the target of such 
preventative policies.  Communities might certainly conclude that the costs 
of intrusive policing or widespread incarceration might be justified if these 
methods could prevent gun violence.321  But it is important to recognize 
 
agree on anything related to gun laws.  But both support a law-enforcement program in 
Richmond that targets gun crimes.”) [https://perma.cc/DU5J-Y9FC]; Richman, supra note 
214, at 372. 
 316. See, e.g., Fields, supra note 315; Richman, supra note 214, at 372. 
 317. See Lance Lindeen, Note, Keep Off the Grass!:  An Alternative Approach to the Gun 
Control Debate, 85 IND. L.J. 1659 & n.2 (2010). 
 318. See supra notes 212–29. 
 319. This is not to say that tough-on-crime policies affect only a narrow swath of the 
population.  Indeed, the power of Alexander’s The New Jim Crow narrative is the argument 
that the ripples of these policies radically alter many communities and society as a whole. 
See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 4. 
 320. Cf. Bernard Harcourt, Matrioshka Dolls, in TRACEY L. MEARES & DAN KAHAN, 
URGENT TIMES:  POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 87 (1999) (raising a 
similar argument in the context of urban policing). 
 321. Cf. Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong:  The Paradox of 
Unwanted Rights, in MEARES & KAHAN, supra note 320, at 3, 3–30 (arguing that residents of 
a housing project should be permitted collectively to waive Fourth Amendment rights via 
referendum in an effort to curb crime).  It is also worth noting that the War on Drugs and 
felon disenfranchisement means that many of the same individuals affected by gun 
possession statutes have been excluded from the voting process and therefore excluded from 
the community decision-making process.  Put another way, defining “community” when 
speaking of community preferences can be quite challenging. See Harcourt, supra note 320, 
at 87.  As a result, even if there might be reason to be more optimistic about local rather than 
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that such a decision may ultimately shift power away from the community 
and into the hands of police and prosecutors. 
That aggressive policing and harsh criminal sentences have become the 
dominant paradigm for discussions of managing gun violence and gun 
possession does not mean that there might not be alternatives.  As the gun 
control movement gained steam in the 1990s, criminal penalties were not 
the only goal sought by gun control proponents.322  Beginning in the 1980s, 
tort litigation became a popular mechanism for victims of gun crime to seek 
redress, with litigation increasing over the following decades.323  Gun 
control advocates, plaintiffs’ lawyers, and tort law scholars advanced a 
number of creative arguments, ranging from public nuisance claims against 
handgun manufacturers,324 to the use of strict liability for enabling torts,325 
to negligent entrustment claims against retailers and dealers.326  
Additionally, some cities have introduced community-based or extralegal 
strategies—including buyback programs and financial incentives to 
discourage offending.327 
Others have provided extensive accounts of these various theories, their 
successes, and their failures.328  But I include this brief mention here to 
emphasize that many of those involved in devising legal solutions to the 
problems of gun violence have not always been constrained by a criminal 
regulatory paradigm.  Based on judicial hostility and legislative responses 
(particularly the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act of 2005),329 a 
 
federal gun laws, see generally Blocher, supra note 282, affected parties might well remain 
un- or underrepresented. 
 322. See Timothy D. Lytton, Introduction:  An Overview of Lawsuits Against the Gun 
Industry 1–5, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY:  A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN 
CONTROL AND MASS TORTS (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005). 
 323. See id. 
 324. See, e.g., Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & John G. Culhane, Public Nuisance Claims 
Against Gun Sellers:  New Insights and Challenges, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2004); 
David Kairys, The Cities Take the Initiative:  Public Nuisance Lawsuits Against Handgun 
Manufacturers, in GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, supra note 13, at 363, 369–
79; Note, Recovering the Costs of Public Nuisance Abatement:  The Public and Private City 
Sue the Gun Industry, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1521–22 (2000). 
 325. See Mark Geistfeld, Tort Law and Criminal Behavior (Guns), 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 311, 
313 (2001). 
 326. See Lytton, supra note 322, at 5. 
 327. See, e.g., DAVID M. KENNEDY, DON’T SHOOT:  ONE MAN, A STREET FELLOWSHIP, AND 
THE END OF VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY AMERICA (2011) (describing Boston’s “Operation 
Ceasefire”); Devone L. Boggan, Opinion, To Stop Crime, Hand Over Cash, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/05/opinion/sunday/to-stop-crime-hand-
over-cash.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/CGR7-HHKN]. 
 328. See, e.g., Jo-Ann Moriarty, Lawsuit Aims at Gun Industry, in GUNS IN AMERICA, 
supra note 118, at 480, 480–85; Andrew J. McClurg, Handguns As Products Unreasonably 
Dangerous Per Se, in GUN CONTROL & GUN RIGHTS:  A READER AND GUIDE 291 (Andrew J. 
McClurg et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter GUN CONTROL & GUN RIGHTS]; ROBERT J. SPITZER, 
THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 143–46 (2008); Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, A Public 
Health Approach to Regulating Firearms As Consumer Products, in GUN CONTROL & GUN 
RIGHTS, supra, at 308. 
 329. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7901–7903 (2012).  The Act was passed “[t]o prohibit causes of 
action against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms or ammunition 
products, and their trade associations, for the harm solely caused by the criminal or unlawful 
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tort-based framework for gun regulation might well be a legal and political 
nonstarter.  But, if the critiques raised in this Article are at all resonant, it 
might be worthwhile to consider whether this or other models (e.g., public-
health based, civil regulatory, or perhaps other tort theories) might provide 
alternatives or supplements to the criminal law regime. 
Further, any criminal regulation of gun possession need not resemble 
ACCA, Project Exile, or the current web of mandatory minimum 
sentencing provisions.330  Neither racialized enforcement nor prosecutorial 
overreach is inevitable.  Indeed, it is conceivable that a modification in the 
drafting of criminal statutes, an alteration in police training, a new turn in 
the Court’s jurisprudence, or a more sustained engagement with structural 
inequalities might reduce the social costs discussed above, so that they no 
longer stand as such a significant counterweight to criminal law’s perceived 
benefits.  That is, perhaps an application of these critiques to the gun 
context suggests the need for legislative action along the lines that yielded 
the FSA. 
All of which is to say that depending on the reader’s political, 
ideological, or experiential priors, the takeaway regarding the ideal way in 
which to regulate gun possession might be very different.  The libertarian 
reader might view the analysis as supporting decriminalization.  The strong 
gun control proponent might conclude that we should temper our use of 
mandatory minimum sentences and rethink policing techniques, but that 
criminal law remains the appropriate regulatory regime.  The proponent of 
tort law as a social gap-filler might contend that this Article provides 
support for private law remedial schemes either in addition to or instead of 
criminal liability for nonviolent gun offenses.331  Regardless, the point 
remains that if these analogies to the drug critiques hold any water, they 
should force us to confront the social costs of criminal gun regulation. 
At the outset of this Article, I identified guns as a test case for the drug 
war’s critical rubric.  Regardless of how much mileage the application of 
these critiques to gun possession yields, my argument is a broader, 
methodological one—what so many scholars have done compellingly with 
the War on Drugs should serve as a framework for the way that we 
approach criminal law going forward.  The drug war’s popular demise has 
brought us a clear language and set of theoretical tools through which to 
address the collateral and distributional costs of governing through crime.  
If these critiques are so convincing in the drug context, a space that was a 
hard case for many people for many decades, then why not elsewhere? 
In some sense, the question comes down to what we will take away from 
the War on Drugs.  We now know that at least some of the banned 
substances were less dangerous than experts believed and that addiction 
 
misuse of firearm products or ammunition products by others when the product functioned 
as designed and intended.” Id. § 7901(b)(1). 
 330. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 331. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Tort in Three Dimensions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 321, 326 
(2011); Allen M. Linden, Tort Law As Ombudsman, 51 CAN. B. REV. 155, 164 (1973). 
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poses a serious public health problem that requires treatment.332  These 
lessons are important.  Yet they are limited in their application and tell us 
little about law, about governance, and about what to do when the next 
progressive criminalization effort rears its head.333  If we focus only on 
these lessons, we are left with debates and policy proposals that rely on the 
“magic wand” view of criminalization.  But what if the lesson is broader?  
We live in a world of hard cases, and criminalization and turning to 
criminal punishment should be hard.  Recognizing the seriousness of a 
social problem should not necessarily be enough to trigger a harsh criminal 
solution.334  Recognizing criminal law’s staggering social costs should be 
the legacy of the War on Drugs. 
CONCLUSION 
Just prior to the War on Crime’s inception, Sanford Kadish warned of the 
costs of criminal law and expressed concern about the overuse of a criminal 
regulatory paradigm.335  Writing in 1968, Kadish argued that 
criminal law is a highly specialized tool of social control, useful for 
certain purposes but not for others; that when improperly used it is 
capable of producing more evil than good; that the decision to criminalize 
any particular behavior must follow only after an assessment and 
balancing of gains and losses. . . .  One hopes that attempts to set out the 
facts and to particularize the perils of overcriminalization may ultimately 
affect the decisions of the legislatures.  But past experience gives little 
cause for optimism.336 
If we are to learn from the War on Drugs and avoid repeating past mistakes, 
it means internalizing the critiques of criminal law, not only in the drug 
context but in other “hard cases.” 
While the War on Drugs has wrought great harm, the increasingly 
widespread recognition of its failure has ushered in a moment of great 
possibility for criminal justice reformers.  Criminal sanctions may remain 
the most popular or politically pragmatic option for gun control 
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proponents,337 but political pragmatism should not curtail a serious 
conversation about the costs of the criminal model and its proper structure.  
By framing debates about gun laws within the context of the War on Drugs’ 
denouement, I hope to sound a note of caution, to suggest that activists, 
attorneys, scholars, and legislators should tread lightly in uncritically 
embracing criminal solutions lest they reinvite the collateral consequences 
of the last criminal war. 
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